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1. Introduction 
If there was any knowledge or fact regarding Hinduism which could be considered universally 
known by almost anyone who has heard of the religion it is that a tremendous amount of gods 
are worshiped by numerous adherents. From a basic fact like this we can often arrive at the 
knowledge that Hinduism is but a collective term for a great many religious traditions, each 
with their own ideologies and important individuals. When thinking of the worshiped gods as 
figures pertaining to a larger pantheon we can often include other individuals who do not 
necessarily have divine, omnipotent or omniscient qualities, but can also be salient heroes from 
epic narratives. In the Rāmāyaṇa our prime hero is Rāma, understood to be an incarnation of 
Viṣṇu and is thus undoubtedly divine. In the Mahābhārata, however, the five principal 
protagonists, the Pāṇḍavas, despite having certain divine attributes, are not universally 
recognized as gods but can be considered as mere literary characters. However, certain 
characters are seen as divine by certain cults who worship them. In certain communities in 
Nepal Bhīma is considered a manifestation of Bhairava (Bühnemann, 2013, 455). There are 
also statues of Bhīma found in Java, which are suggestive of worship (Stutterheim, 1956, 105). 
Hiltebeitel also published a two-volume study on a South Indian Draupadī cult (1988, 1991). 
And even outside these cults who worship these figures as divine, the field of literary studies 
confirm the popularity among Hindus of the much-beloved, heroic Arjuna by focusing certain 
studies on him, as can be seen in the work of Katz (1989). Even Karṇa has been focused on as 
being the hero as evidenced in the study of McGrath (2004). These foci on these particular 
individuals, or “characters”, of the Mahābhārata illustrate just how significant this epic story 
and religious scripture is within Hinduism. These larger-than-life characters have inspired the 
imaginations of generations of Hindus and provided them with role models to look up to. 
However, amidst these specific religious cults and academic foci, I have noticed that the 
character of Yudhiṣṭhira is not that much focused on. Why? 
 Yudhiṣṭhira is the eldest among the five Pāṇḍavas. He is the royal heir, the one who is 
destined to take the throne of Hastinapura and rule as the designated king. He is also the 
dharma-rāja, being a character who is both well-versed in and lives according to the precepts 
of dharma. In many of the decisive moments in the epic narrative Yudhiṣṭhira stands at the 
center. Many situations are played out and happen relative to him, and the narrative concludes 
with a depiction of his moral worth. He is also the epic’s prominent contender of fulfilling the 
role of a moral exemplar. A moral exemplar is a character whose behavior and often his or her 
very being is aligned with the didactic dimension of the narrative. The moral exemplar stands 
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out because he or she embodies moral virtues. The dharma-rāja has an inherently moral 
understanding of dharma, which is reflected in his oft-mentioned virtues of patience, pacifism, 
equanimity and forgiving nature. Why, then, are there no religious cults for Yudhiṣṭhira, or 
even studies which center only on him? To answer this question we must turn to the entirety of 
the Mahābhārata and to the scholarly tradition devoted to the study of this paramount Hindu 
scripture. We must acknowledge the complex, puzzling nature of the epic, which is caused not 
only by the sprawling narrative but also the copious didactic material. All these factors are not 
only the reason behind the Mahābhārata’s famed magnitude but also a justification of the long 
tradition of scholarship devoted to making sense of it. It will become clear how this complex 
nature of the epic is the reason behind the complexity of Yudhiṣṭhira’s character, which keeps 
him from being a clear hero, a well-defined paragon or moral exemplar. 
To illustrate this situation fully we must start with the fact that Western academia agrees 
that when one deals with the Mahābhārata one deals not with a singular text but a dynamic 
textual tradition wherein countless of authors revised, edited, but, more importantly, made 
additions to the text for over hundreds of years. It is nearly impossible to trace this process and 
as such one cannot claim with certainty the existence of any Ur-text or how that might have 
looked. Debates, treatises and instructions of religious and philosophical nature have been 
added alongside the unfolding narrative, creating a prominent didactic aspect as part of the 
epic. As such, when it comes to discussing the epic’s contents it would be considered unwise 
to assume an overall cohesiveness and continuity of thought and intention. This cautionary 
approach lead to a bracketing in the Mahābhārata scholarship, which mostly separated the 
didactic religious dimension from the narrative, as these were found to serve completely 
unrelated goals. However, more recent scholarship, as conducted by the likes of Biardeau, van 
Buitenen, Fitzgerald, Hiltebeitel, Sutton and Malinar, urge for a revision of such views. They 
claim that the narrative and didactic parts are not only compatible but also enforce one another 
and that they mutually enrich an understanding of the other. While not every scholar agrees 
with such an approach – and even when they do it is not always to the same extent – I myself 
would argue for this unifying outlook, and I would like to illustrate its validity with my 
particular focus. 
 In explaining the role, purpose and complex nature of Yudhiṣṭhira as the moral center 
of the narrative is to address a number of issues which serves many ends. Firstly, it sheds light 
on the complex and puzzling nature of the Mahābhārata and the call for clarity, inasmuch as 
it can be achieved. Secondly, it assumes a connection between the different aspects and 
dimensions of the epic, in which we can find some of this clarity. If there is a moral exemplar 
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in the narrative then that character is aligned with the teachings and ideals presented in the 
didactic part of the Mahābhārata. It will be shown that through Yudhiṣṭhira the very concept 
of moral exemplar in itself is appropriated and redefined by the Mahābhārata, which is the 
epic’s own way of dealing with a very difficult matter: the multitude of worldviews and 
philosophies it aims to represent. 
 The Mahābhārata was composed and shaped during a time in India which is coined the 
Epic Age. Old, world-affirming worldviews were challenged by newly emerging rather world-
rejecting philosophies – designating the rise of Buddhism, Jainism and other forms of 
asceticism. These different worldviews, the former stemming from the Vedas and the latter 
from a more contemplative and meditative trend, are represented in the epic’s didactic portion 
through copious instructive religious treatises. The tensions between these worldviews give 
rise to the tensions which take place in the narrative of the Mahābhārata (Sutton, 2000, 8). 
This means that the Mahābhārata contains a vast array of morals, which do not often see eye 
to eye. Therefore, various studies have suggested different heroes and paragons as is witnessed 
in the focus on Bhīma, Arjuna and even Karṇa. In assuming that a certain quality of either of 
these individuals is more salient than others would indicate an intellectual allegiance with a 
certain ideology and its understanding of morality. Here I would point to Yudhiṣṭhira, the eldest 
of the Pāṇḍavas, to be the center-point of moral idealism. Not because he towers above all 
others in moral standpoint as the dharma-rāja, but more because of his conflicting nature. 
Yudhiṣṭhira, being a kṣatriya and royal heir, does not live up to the ideals of either category 
due to his soft, forgiving and pacifist nature. Not showing assertiveness in the face of adversity 
and not living up to his duty to punish wrongdoers, Yudhiṣṭhira is a walking contradiction. 
Whereas others scholars have earlier indicated Yudhiṣṭhira’s nature to indicate the tension 
between one’s duty and one’s nature, I would go so far as to say that Yudhiṣṭhira is the very 
locus of the conflicting ideologies and philosophies which characterize the Epic Age as 
represented in the Mahābhārata. The tensions between the ideologies are not only synonymous 
with the tensions between the different factions and characters in the narrative, but are primarily 
located within this one individual. The character of Yudhiṣṭhira illustrates the most striking 
conflicts which defined a historic moment in the intellectual history of the Indian subcontinent 
contained within this one person. He is indeed a moral exemplar, but because a variety of 
morals and ideologies are presented Yudhiṣṭhira cannot be portrayed as a clear role model, as 
he is meant to indicate their contradictions. Because of his qualities as an almost strictly moral 
character he makes decisions which often result in misfortune for the Pāṇḍavas. Through 
Yudhiṣṭhira the epic poets of the Mahābhārata think beyond the heroism and moral idealism 
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as characterized by other characters. Yudhiṣṭhira is the hero who makes us question the validity 
of the concept of heroism, he is the moral exemplar of ideologies which conflict with one 
another, making us question how far his salient virtues will bring us. 
 In focusing on Yudhiṣṭhira’s qualities and behavior, in his decisions and their results, 
we gain not only an understanding of the competing ideologies brought forth by the 
Mahābhārata, but also how the latter comments on them. It is often said that the moral 
dilemmas in the narrative of the Mahābhārata are questions posed by the author(s) without any 
clear solution given, as the audience is encouraged to reflect and make up their own minds 
(Ibid, 7). Because of this a single definitive reading of the Mahābhārata is not possible and I 
do not make the claim that the reading I provide is more valid than others. I do, however, aim 
to shed light on the narrative tactics of the Mahābhārata surrounding the portrayal of 
Yudhiṣṭhira as well as the joint effort of both the religious didactus and the narrative to nudge 
the minds of the audience, often diverse in outlooks and beliefs as attested by the historical 
period, towards the appropriate queries. Yudhiṣṭhira is meant to be questioned, not seen as a 
role model. Because of this he is the most important character in the Mahābhārata, connecting 
its narrative and didactic aspects. 
 
The Corpus 
I have stated that in order to answer the question why Yudhiṣṭhira is not focused on and in 
explaining how his character is testimony to the epic’s awareness of its complexity we must 
consider the entirety of the Mahābhārata and the academic tradition devoted to understanding 
the epic. Having an awareness of the didactic and narrative aspects of the text and the tendency 
of academics to focus on either of these dimensions we need to draw on both to find Yudhiṣṭhira 
at the center. As such, we will not only look at studies on theology and philosophy but also on 
literary criticism. As for the Mahābhārata, concerning its riddling history and its vastness, 
there are many versions and translations one can consult, each with their own strengths and 
weaknesses. For this study I have consulted the translations of van Buitenen (1973, 1975, 1978) 
and Fitzgerald (2004). Although their translations belong to the same edition (University of 
Chicago Press), this edition remains uncompleted to this day, as some books, mainly the ones 
which deal with the actual war, are not translated. The translations of van Buitenen and 
Fitzgerald are of the critical edition (as designated by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research 
Institute). Thus, many of the quotes from the Mahābhārata in this thesis are translated by either 
van Buitenen or Fitzgerald. 
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Since the Mahābhārata itself is famous for its expansiveness it would be both 
impractical to focus on everything and impossible to contain that within the confines of this 
thesis. As such, I will focus only on passages which revolve around Yudhiṣṭhira or put him 
aside other characters for the sake of comparison but also instances which provide a clear 
picture or give us insight into the nature and character of Yudhiṣṭhira. I will especially focus 
on certain quotes wherein the character’s thoughts, reasoning and desires are laid bare. I would 
also like to focus on quotes from characters who directly comment on Yudhiṣṭhira’s behavior 
and decisions, as this gives us an impression not only how other characters in the narrative 
regard Yudhiṣṭhira but also because they seem to echo how the epic poets thought about his 
character and what he stood for. I will also consult academic writings on the historical period 
wherein the Mahābhārata took form, the Epic Age. I will focus here especially on the history 
of the intellectual developments during this period as herein we can find the worldviews 
represented in the Mahābhārata. 
 As such, among the theological academic studies I will primarily use Sutton’s Religious 
Doctrines in the Mahābhārata (2000), which I will be quoting extensively. Malinar’s study on 
the Bhagavad Gītā (2007), for her insights in the connection between the didactic and the 
narrative. Bowles’ study on dharma represented in the Mahābhārata and his chapter on 
Yudhiṣṭhira in Dharma, Disorder and the Political in Ancient India (2007). I will also draw on 
Bronkhorst’s studies on ancient intellectual Indian history in Greater Magadha (2007). 
 
The Argument 
All these and more sources will be consulted in my study of the role and purpose of Yudhiṣṭhira 
within the Mahābhārata. It starts with the realization of the fact that Yudhiṣṭhira has never 
been a popular focus, either in religious cults or academic studies. Although there are scholars 
who have realized the nature and importance of Yudhiṣṭhira as a means to explore the 
contrasting ideologies (Bowles, 2007, 133), or just his primary importance in the narrative 
(Hiltebeitel, 2001, 47). However, neither of these examples provided a full study on 
Yudhiṣṭhira alone, and if the awareness of him being the locus through which the contrast 
between philosophies is explored, it is not tied to a grander argument or realization that 
Yudhiṣṭhira is a character in the narrative through which the didactic portion is explored, 
hinting at a more cohesive quality behind the vast Mahābhārata. The prime question which 
pervades this thesis is whether or not my view regarding Yudhiṣṭhira, his role in the 
Mahābhārata and the assertion of its wholesome quality is justified. I will arrive at this 
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realization by asking: Why is Yudhiṣṭhira used as a conduit for this end? Why should the 
contrast between the ideologies be explored? What do these ideologies and philosophies teach 
and why? And how is this all explored and realized through one character?  
In answering these questions my study will in the second chapter illustrate a historical 
awareness by providing a clear overview of the developments and contradictions of the Epic 
Age and how this influenced the making of the Mahābhārata. It will be shown in the third 
chapter how the Mahābhārata was composed because of and as a reaction to these historical 
developments which decidedly influenced Indian culture and Hinduism significantly. This will 
illustrate the nature of the Mahābhārata being both a religious scripture and reflexive narrative 
to further the intellectual traditions of debate also to resolve certain conflicts in ideology. In 
the fourth chapter I will focus on Yudhiṣṭhira’s role in this endeavor by illustrating instances 
in the narrative where his character sheds light on these issues. And in the fifth chapter I will 
both challenge and justify my focus on Yudhiṣṭhira as being the most important character in 
the narrative, and what this means for the purpose for which his character was used. In its 
entirety, this thesis will add to the scholarly discussion of the Mahābhārata and whether or not 
we ought to regard the different didactic and narrative aspects as enriching one another and 
will argue that they should not be seen as distinct from one another. And, more importantly, it 
will do this through focusing on the character of Yudhiṣṭhira, whose significance between the 
narrative and didactic aspect has hitherto not been subject to a similar emphasis. 
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2. The Epic Age 
Before any thorough assessment of Yudhiṣṭhira’s moral dimension can be performed we are 
required to understand a significant chapter in Indian history, for in the Mahābhārata an 
expansive period is reflected upon and a sound understanding of this history results in the 
clarification of some of the most puzzling of the epic’s aspects. The period in question, roughly 
the first millennium BCE (Keay, 1999, 37), is often termed the “Epic Period” or “Epic Age”, 
and this majestic prefix largely owes its placement not only to the formation of the Rāmāyaṇa 
and Mahābhārata, the two major Sanskrit epics and most famous Hindu narratives, but also to 
the formative developments which took place during this age of radical transformations. 
Amidst a gradual and complex process of Aryanization the established worldviews of Vedic 
ritualism were challenged by a newly emergent world-rejecting asceticism, marking the birth 
of non-Vedic schools of thought such as Buddhism and Jainism. The ascetic tendencies of these 
emerging traditions provided a new standard and philosophical ideal based on renunciation. 
This world-rejecting tendency progressively came to pervade almost all religious and social 
layers of the subcontinent. The traditions and ideologies which ensued from this, all with a 
varying degree of eclecticism, eventually influenced Indian culture and Hinduism into forms 
and patterns more recognizable according to today’s standards. 
 As decidedly illuminating this particular period is, however, much of our knowledge 
on it is drawn from a variety of sources which contain almost all but a clear historical chronicle. 
The oft-mentioned issue of India’s frustrating absence of historical accounts weighs heavily on 
any attempt at providing a historical context as I intend to here. As history has been “teased 
from less articulate subjects such as coins, random inscriptions, tidbits of oral traditions, 
literary and religious texts” (Keay, 1999, xvii, emphasis is mine), and itihāsa, the Sanskrit term 
for history (“what happened”), also refers collectively to the two Sanskrit epics (Carman, 2001, 
138). Although there might be a certain degree of history reflected in the heroic epics, it is, 
however, not our concern to detect whether specific instances in the narrative really happened 
but look at the grander dynamic of the story which seem to hint to historic developments. The 
chapters devoted to the royal exile into the wilderness, patterns of the noble endeavor of Aryan 
“colonization” settlement of the subcontinent (Keay, 1999, 23) narrate a process of settlement, 
which led to the collision of various different philosophies and ideologies. The emerging 
ascetic ideas and the Vedic worldviews that they rivalled comprise a period of far-reaching 
contradictions, all of which are reflected upon in the Mahābhārata. These spiritual conflicts 
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are the source for some of the most meaningful tensions in the epic (Sutton, 2000, 1), and are 
the main driving forces behind the complex personage of king Yudhiṣṭhira. 
 
Dharma 
Although dharma as pertaining exclusively to Yudhiṣṭhira, the dharma-rāja, will be fully 
focused on in the fourth and fifth chapters, it is important to introduce the generality of this 
concept, as well as its complexity. Throughout the Epic Age the concept of dharma grew more 
influential but also difficult to understand. This centrality and complexity of dharma is by far 
the greatest issue explored in the Mahābhārata in both its didactic and narrative portions. The 
concept of dharma finds its power in its centrality and near universality to Indian civilization, 
irrespective to linguistic, sectarian or regional differences (Olivelle, 2017, 1). The notions 
underlying this term are as varied as the religious traditions in which it is featured, to the point 
that dharma can be ascribed to have both a unifying and dividing quality thanks to its criticality 
across both Hindu and even Buddhist and Jain traditions and their different understandings of 
it. Even within the confines of the Mahābhārata the word dharma “signifies a concept that is 
one of the most central and important topics of thought and debate” (Fitzgerald, 2005, 671). 
Many of the tensions within both the narrative and didactic dimensions of the epic are played 
out through, or even caused by the subtlety of dharma1. Hudson even states that the prime 
question the Mahābhārata asks is “why is the dharmic path implicated in so much sorrow?” 
(2013, 28). This “subtlety” is largely caused by the baffling amount of understandings 
individuals have of the concept. Whereas simply believed to be “right conduct”, the following 
quote from Fitzgerald aptly summarized how exactly such an understanding gives way for 
confusion and thus tension: 
 
The single biggest problem in coming to terms with dharma in the Mahābhārata is the 
tremendous abundance of instances of it, and then the many different modes of variation 
within and among those different instances of the word. The word dharma occurs in a 
number of different contexts and applications in the epic and these various pragmatic 
situations give the word an initially indistinct range of nuances and colorings. Many 
passages in the Mahābhārata often present the value and importance of dharma as taken 
                                                 
1 This is quoted by the character Bhīṣma himself when he is unable to answer Draupadi’s piercing questions 
after her humiliation at the hands of the Kauravas. He says that the matter, and to an extend dharma (here 
translated as “law”, is “subtle, and mysterious as well as grave” (MBh: 2.62.17-19, transl. by van Buitenen, 
1975). 
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for granted, but it is not easy to abstract a common, taken-for-granted element from all 
these passages. Also, the Mahābhārata does not always speak with one voice about the 
particular behavior or behaviors that actually have the status of dharma, and sometimes 
what particular actions or behaviors constitute dharma are said to be unknown. A 
number of didactic passages in the text take it upon themselves to spell out in detail the 
variety of behaviors that are dharma for different people, an action that, besides its 
explicit messages, implies that someone felt some kind of need to put these matters 
straight. Many other passages see the word dharma invoked when characters in the epic 
debate among themselves whether some behavior is dharma or not, or debate the 
evaluation of actions done in the past, or pit one claim of dharma against another, or 
set one character to persuading another, or others, that some behavior is or is not 
dharma. The word is also used to praise (or, if its opposite, adharma, occurs, to 
criticize) some agent’s motives, ethical sensibilities, or the general quality of his or her 
life and accumulated deeds (2004, 672).  
 
A single term that refers to a more moral human existence can create such confusion because 
its definition has been used over centuries for different ends. Fitzgerald’s description of the 
complex situation illustrates exactly how the Mahābhārata, in both its narrative and didactic 
aspects, reflects on the developments of the Epic Age. 
 
Vedic Values 
While the earliest mention of the term dharma can be found in the Ṛgveda, we are not able to 
gather a lot of information regarding its meaning and what implications it might have had for 
the religious traditions who placed the Vedas central to their philosophies. Meaning can be 
derived from its Sanskrit root word dhṛ-, which means “to hold” or “to support” (Horsch, 2004, 
424). Factor in the Vedic worldview where a cosmic equilibrium is maintained between men 
and gods through the medium of mandatory sacrifices, and the notion of “support” can quickly 
be interpreted to signify the foundations of creation, the Vedic sacrifices (Brereton, 2004, 485). 
This cosmic order and balance is in the Veda’s actually understood as ṛta, and this concept 
might be the predecessor of dharma (Rukmani, 1989, 23).  However, more information is not 
provided by the Vedas as to any more practical usages of the term dharma, let alone what it 
induces an individual to do or, more importantly with subsequent usages of the term, how to 
do things. In fact, in most of the Vedic literature, which include the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, 
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Āraṇyakas and Upanishads, the term dharma was a marginal term at best, explains Olivelle, 
and it did not play a central role in the religious worlds depicted in these texts (2004, 491). 
Perhaps there were concepts similar to how dharma is described, but they were not yet 
designated as dharma, the only thing that comes closest to it is ṛta. This concept in which ritual 
sacrifices comprised the most instrumental of societal responsibilities to uphold a balanced 
relationship with the Vedic gods, personifications of the forces of nature, signified a symmetric 
cosmic power balance. In such a worldview, where the brahmins were at the apex of the societal 
pyramid, comprised a very this-worldly outlook in which spirituality entailed little more than 
the endeavor of securing a viable afterlife among one’s ancestors. An awareness of this duty-
bound ideology is relevant not only to the other ideologies which challenged this, but also to 
the reflection of this ageing system in the much later Mahābhārata. 
But it would take centuries before the term dharma would connote any such school of 
thought, let alone take a central position in any of these schools in a manner similar to its 
centrality in the Mahābhārata. Only within the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa an instance occurs where 
we find dharma used in a manner relevant to its usage in the Mahābhārata. Dharma here 
signified the law and order in society, an “abstract entity that stands above and gives legitimacy 
to kṣatra, the ruling power of the king” (Ibid, 497). Its use around royalty is crucial, as this 
reflected on a period where royal rule was slowly becoming a unifying norm. Dharma referred 
to matters for which people came to the king, such as legal disputes. Dharma was thus placed 
within the public realm of law and social norms that must be overseen by the king (Ibid, 495). 
brahmins depended on such a ritually stratified society, with rules depending on ritual 
consecration and advice of the brahmins. Yet this system was threatened by the slow advent of 
urbanization, which also gave rise to asceticism and other worldviews, which in turn challenged 
the caste system and other elements of this-worldly lifestyles. Brahmins were able to remain in 
position by these duties of royalty. Thus this worldview of the ‘dharmic duties’ of the king 
were propagated by texts composed to serve brahmin causes of upholding a cultural Vedic 
hegemony, as its presence became undermined by new players which emerged on the stage of 
Indian history.  
  
Asceticism 
Figureheads such as the Buddha and Mahāvīra became influential because of a growing 
dissatisfaction with Vedic ritualism, and thus a larger trend of alternative spirituality grew into 
what are now known to be the biggest rival traditions within the dharmic religions of South 
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Asia. A trend so far-reaching in its popularity and sometimes even outrageous in their practices 
that the high-caste brahmins were forced to present a response with a rivalling ideology 
(Sharma, 1992, 176) (Bronkhorst, 2015, 2). As I had mentioned before, with the advent of 
urbanization the trend of asceticism grew rapidly as alternatives for the now unsatisfying 
world-view of the Vedas and their ritualism. Why exactly this asceticism emerged is still 
unknown, and while it is easy to entertain the possibilities of Axial thought, if we are to focus 
on merely one geographical area and not a worldwide phenomenon more viable explanations 
have to be considered, regardless of our lack of definite knowledge on the time period. The 
very process of urbanization is considered by Olivelle to be the cause of this. Whereas the 
original Aryans were nomadic tribesmen, pastoralism and agriculture had caused a more 
localized settlement and dependence on natural phenomena, as evidenced in the Vedic 
mythology. Yet as this urbanization grew, a larger amount of people were exposed to a myriad 
of diseases and other natural disasters such as floods. This awareness of a seemingly imminent 
presence of death and the rather arbitrary ways in which it could manifest inspired a more 
pessimistic outlook on the world and human activity in it (Olivelle, 1998, 6). The concept that 
suffering pervades life by default is a notion we see resurfaced in Buddhism, even in the life 
story of Siddhārtha Gautama himself. Needless to say, the transition to urbanization, however 
gradual, was also accompanied with a growing sense of individualism. A growing market and 
broadened economy is commonly believed to have aided this process, but what remains most 
crucial behind our awareness of this individualism is not how it came about but what it came 
to contrast, the communal spirit which pervaded the Vedic worldview. Because this 
individualism expressed itself most fervently in spiritual terms we are able to witness the rise 
in popularity of concepts such as individual karma and reincarnation, and the more central role 
of the concept of dharma, which took on a more moral-salvific connotation. 
 However, still much controversy remains regarding this period, and while the 
chronology provided above seems to satisfy any attempt at conceptual clarification, whether or 
not it completely makes sense cannot be validated. If urbanization wrought the conflict of such 
distinct worldviews at the turn of the millennium, then why could the civilizations of Harappa 
and Mohenjo-Daro not achieve a similar development, almost an entire millennium preceding 
the period in question? Our lack of archeological and documental evidence from either of these 
places keep us from gaining a clear picture, therefore we are unable to put the Indus Valley 
Civilization in the history of these intellectual developments. And yet there is reason to believe 
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that the ancient religious traditions2, which existed most likely before and alongside the Vedic 
Aryans, already possessed a spirituality in which notions such as karma and reincarnation were 
already present, regardless of any trend of individualism which urbanization might have 
started. Another possibility is put forth by Bronkhorst, who surmises that ideas of karma, 
rebirth and liberation originated in a region called Greater Magadha3. These worldviews with 
concepts such as karma and reincarnation had already prevailed in that region before it collided 
with the distinct Vedic culture which came from the West. In their eastward expansion, the 
brahmin culture subsumed that of Greater Magadha and appropriated their spiritual concepts 
of karma and reincarnation which were alien to Vedic beliefs, all between the second century 
BCE and the second or third century CE (Bronkhorst, 2007, 2). Bronkhorst’s views, however, 
are considered highly problematic. The number one issue found with the above claims, is the 
apparent anachronism with the evidence found in Vedic literature itself. Ideas of karma, 
reincarnation and liberation are found in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads - texts 
usually assigned to the sixth or fifth century BCE, early enough to suppose an origin within the 
sphere of Vedic religion (Wynne, 2011, 1). Some of Bronkhorst’s insights, however, prove 
extremely relevant and edifying in realizing the stark difference between the ideologies. It is 
also the next stage of appropriation and transformation of the concept of dharma. Thus, with 
the aforementioned criticism in mind we will consider Bronkhorst’s contribution. 
 Both in Buddhism and Jainism can we find the characteristic concepts which defined 
the culture of the Greater Magadha, and while we are uncertain in what manner and when these 
streams had come in contact with brahmanism, it has become clear that the concept of dharma 
had been appropriated from Buddhism, to become a canvas to which a variety of traditions 
attributed their spiritual values. In Buddhism dharma, or dhamma, was an already complex 
concept, as it connoted ideals on spiritual teachings, the idea of right or proper conduct – ideally 
in relation to a king but also beyond that, nature – as in an individual’s nature or the nature of 
things, and Truth – the kind that is capitalized (Gethin, 2004, 518). Whereas most of these 
meanings came in use over time, the entire idea that a single term was used in a manner central 
to an ideology, denoting the path to liberation (Bronkhorst, 2004, 736), had far reaching 
repercussions. 
                                                 
2 Often designated as śramana, most likely the first to believe in karma and reincarnation. 
3 Although Bronkhorst does not include any map to designate the area in question, he described it to be 
“stretched by and large from Śrāvastī, the capital of Kosala, in the north-west to Rājagṛha, the capital of 
Magadha, in the south-east” (Bronkhorst, 2007, 4). 
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 The salvific path in Jainism has some slight differences to that of Buddhism. 
Nevertheless, the concepts of karma and rebirth also stand central in this spiritual ideology. To 
trace the precise meaning of dharma in Jainism would not be relevant for our understanding. 
Suffice it to say that just like in Buddhism the term dharma had assumed a myriad of meanings, 
the most frequently used being its referral to the Jain teaching in general (Qvarnström, 2004, 
599). Thus here dharma was also imbued with the specific eccentricities as found in the religion 
itself, and this was a very peculiar brand of asceticism. Just like in Buddhism the Jain ideal was 
similarly expressed in a world-rejecting philosophy. This would manifest in asceticism in 
which the appropriation of karma was sought to be countered, primarily through meditation 
and the elimination of action. Living according to dharma had, for these traditions, a slight 
difference in what they considered to be the source of the accumulation of karma. According 
to Bronkhorst the Jains saw evil in physical activity, whereas the Buddhists believed mental 
activities to be the source behind misery (2007, 18). Thus living according to dharma was 
expressed according to the former in suppressing any physical activity – taking the form of 
motionless mendicants in the wilderness – or meditation stilling mental qualms and desires 
according to the latter. In the Jain case Bronkhorst seems to stress on the severity of Jain 
asceticism in particular, stressing the cessation of all activity (2001, 15), Wynne, however, 
reminds us that these extremes occurred seldom and are in no way representative for common 
spiritual practice among the Jains (2011, 3). Yet what is relevant is how the term dharma fared 
around the formation of these ideals. If attachment to and involvement in material affairs could 
bring only suffering then remaining aloof would be the most beneficial option, dharma had 
slowly come to represent this attitude, which would eventually be the backdrop of 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s preferred understanding of dharma, as a universally moral code which 
emphasized detachment. 
 
Brahminical Reclamation 
After these developments, witnessing the voluntary withdrawals from society among an 
increasing amount of individuals, the brahminical caste was forced to respond. This response 
would reinstitute a society based on caste wherein brahmins could remain instrumental, and for 
this the term dharma was appropriated. Brahmanic ideology would not purge itself from ideas 
commonly associated with their rivals, as we see in Upaniṣadic philosophy the world-rejecting 
outlook was almost fully appropriated, though never forsaking the authority of the Vedas. It 
would draw them in a grander whole wherein it could both stay ahead of the trends and uphold 
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the hegemony of brahmanic authority. The clearest instance of this would be the significance 
given to dharma in the dharmaśāstras. The concept of dharma was placed in the center of a 
newly defined worldview, where all the castes had their own respective dharmas – which 
designated their individual customs. Thus the right or proper conduct was as manifold as the 
different layers of society. It also came to signify an inner-worldly way to salvation, accessible 
to any caste and possible to be pursued in the acts of everyday life (Wezler, 2004, 648). 
 Yet it was not through the dharmaśāstras alone that brahmin thinkers revitalized and 
propagated their worldviews. By this time the well-known stories of the Bhārata war and the 
battle against Rāvaṇa had been reworked to serve the same ends. These stories came to reflect 
societal systems that were ideal for brahminical influence to prevail, they were laden with the 
dharmic duties of the king and the prominence of the priestly class in discerning them. Yet it 
was especially the narrative of the Mahābhārata which had undergone this process most. It 
was so heavily reworked for propaganda purposes; lengthy edifying sermons were interpolated 
as well as other extraneous additions (Keay, 1999, 38). Any original core text was long buried 
beneath these revisions and the narrative came to reflect not only the gradual development of 
Aryan settlement, as I mentioned before, but also reflected on the entire history of ideas and 
philosophical concepts as I laid out in this chapter. It not only reflected on these developments 
but also directly presented them as crucial aspects of the narrative. And when for instance the 
ascetic tendencies of withdrawal seemed too self-destructive the Mahābhārata directly 
responds to them, either in the alienated portrayal of Yudhiṣṭhira and his pacifist attitude or 
outright condemning them through Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad Gītā (Bronkhorst, 2007, 35).  
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3. The Philosophies of the Mahābhārata 
All these historical developments were formative for Indian culture and society and Hinduism 
to change into realities more recognizable according to today’s standards. However, it was 
especially the reach and popularity of the epic Mahābhārata to highly influence different 
cultural regions in India into following a somewhat hegemonic brahmanic socio-cultural 
outlook. Religiously ideological and philosophically spiritual views and tendencies were the 
foundation upon which such societies and cultures could flourish, and these were found aplenty 
in the Mahābhārata. 
 During and after these historical developments, as explored in the previous chapter, the 
Mahābhārata was formed. Countless additions and revisions, which we cannot possibly pin 
any date or individual to, are the reason behind the epic’s incredible size. However, the 
religious and philosophical rich content of the Mahābhārata resulted in the dual nature the epic 
is nowadays associated with. Scholars often talk about a ‘narrative’ and ‘didactic’ dimension 
of the epic (Malinar, 2016, 2). Many early scholars of Sanskrit (Hopkins, 1902) (Dahlmann, 
1895, 1899) there was a clear break between these two aspects, as they do not necessarily 
coincide or reinforce one another. However, it has become a growing trend within western 
academia to attempt a more ‘holistic’ reading of the entire epic (Malinar, 2007, 2) (Matilal, 
1989, 5). If this chapter aims to bring to the fore the various religious and philosophical 
teachings of the epic it seems axiomatic I will focus on the didactic aspect. Yet, if my larger 
argument is kept in mind – which is that one can find the personality of Yudhiṣṭhira, a central 
character in the narrative of the epic, within these philosophies and that through him their merits 
are explored – then it becomes clear that I suggest a closer correlation between the narrative 
and didactic aspects. At the onset I have to state that I do agree with the view that haphazardly 
connecting hitherto totally unrelated dots scattered among either of these sides does not 
necessarily reveal a deeper link between them. As such, my focus on Yudhiṣṭhira is meant to 
show how, through his personality and actions throughout the narrative, these philosophies are 
reflected upon. Thereby I infer a closer connection between the narrative and didactic parts of 
the epic. I will now therefore focus on the didactic aspect of the epic, evaluating its main 
teachings. Only after an awareness of these teaching can I endeavor to locate them within and 
around Yudhiṣṭhira.  
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Religious Authority 
Before I will focus on the ideological, religious, spiritual and philosophical content of the 
Mahābhārata I would like to reflect on why such a focus is warranted in the first place. Unique 
for any epic narrative is its own self-awareness and self-assertion as an authoritative religious 
scripture. Sutton notes how even among its only other counterpart in the Sanskrit literary sphere 
the Mahābhārata differs from the Rāmāyaṇa in that the latter does not contain didactic material 
to the extent the former does (2000, ix). Allusions to the four eternal Vedas immediately come 
to mind, as the Mahābhārata is religiously accepted as the ‘fifth Veda’, distilling Vedic 
knowledge in narrative form for all of mankind (Fitzgerald, 1985, 130). According to Sullivan, 
such an allusion to the continuity of Vedic knowledge goes deeper than a simple claim to 
authority. One of the most profound ways the Mahābhārata argues for its religious significance 
is through the involvement of Vyāsa (1994, 377). The Mahābhārata is, according to the Hindu 
tradition and the epic itself, authored by Vyāsa, and Sullivan notes how western scholars often 
tend to see his authorship as merely ‘symbolic’. According to Sullivan the fact behind this 
authorship indicates that “status and authority as religious texts are to some extent dependent 
on the status and authority of Vyāsa” (Ibid). Vyāsa’s image in Hindu mythology represents the 
head of the lineage of gurus4, and his role as participant in the narrative of the epic itself 
reinforces the religious significance and authority of the epic. Vyāsa both created the 
Mahābhārata and fathered the Bhārata family in the narrative. In this dual sense of “creator” 
Vyāsa both manages the story and serves as ancestor to the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas (Ibid, 379). 
 His function as both an author propagating a message and a fatherly figure distilling 
wisdom and knowledge reinforce one another in instances where either of these functions are 
the prime focus. The image of Vyāsa feeling the need to write down the Mahābhārata narrative 
in the outermost frame story (excluded from the critical edition) for which he employs the aid 
of Gaṇeśa reassures divine approval (Fitzgerald, 1985, 125). This image can be juxtaposed 
against Vyāsa admonishing Yudhiṣṭhira for his lack of kṣatriya resolve and detailing to him 
the qualities of a true monarch. Right after winning the war Yudhiṣṭhira is overcome with 
tremendous guilt: “I am a wicked sinner responsible for ruining the earth” and will “not eat or 
drink anything at all” in an attempt to absolve his sins (Mahābhārata: 12.27.22-24). To this 
Vyāsa responds: 
                                                 
4 This, according to Sullivan, also ties in to Vyāsa’s relation with Brahma rather than the often discussed 
relation to Kṛṣṇa. Brahma, just as Vyāsa, is known as the most authoritative of Gurus and both are the ancestors 
of two factions which end up fighting one another, the devas and asuras and the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas (1992, 
379). 
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They must understand that what is Lawful and what is Unlawful are both twofold: There 
is inactivity and activity; the twofold nature pertains to ordinary life and the Veda. 
Immortality results from inactivity; mortality is the result of activity. One should 
understand that bad things are the result of bad actions, and good things are the result 
of good actions. And the good or bad results of these two would come about on account 
of the goodness or badness of the actions, whether those results be heaven or something 
leading to heaven, or life or death (MBh: 12.37.9-11).  
 
This lecture in spiritual practice, one among many similar ones in the Mahābhārata, 
reprimands Yudhiṣṭhira’s outlook whereas also commenting on a growing trend of asceticism 
which worried brahmins, on which I will focus later. Another such instance can be found in the 
Aśvamedhika  Parva, where Vyāsa is the chief ritual priest of the aśvamedha ritual, advising 
Yudhiṣṭhira the right course of action (Mahābhārata, 14.3.8) in the wake of his disillusionment 
since the war (Sullivan, 1999, 32). These instances not only serve as profound ways a father 
figure can advise a son, they also reflect the ideal brahminical way of how society ought to be 
governed. The kṣatriya king seeks advise from brahmins who can provide impeccable 
knowledge for the benefit of all of society: “brahmins should work together with kṣatriyas, the 
intellectuals should advice the rulers” (MBh: 12.73.15). The fact that this ideal situation is 
played out by the author of the text and his grandson who is the royal heir and dharma-rāja 
makes its exemplary impact all the greater. 
 
The Main Spiritual Tendencies 
However, despite all these lofty descriptions of the Mahābhārata being the fifth Veda, i.e. an 
authorized śāstra which distills profound spiritual knowledge, the epic’s purpose as a religious 
scripture does not at all appear clear within the myriad of Sanskrit religious literature. This is 
because the Mahābhārata does not bring forth a single, well-defined doctrine, it presents many. 
I have stated earlier that the Mahābhārata has caused a divisive response from scholars because 
of its apparently distinct didactic and narrative material, yet within the didactus alone the 
religious and philosophical contents can be worlds apart and seemingly irreconcilable. This is, 
of course, a reflection of the history as we already explored. Whereas much can be written on 
how to deal with this myriad of worldviews, suffice it to say that I adhere to Sutton’s insight 
of the epic’s awareness of its many-natured ideologies. No easy coherent doctrinal system is 
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provided because the text is simply reluctant to resort to simplistic formulae, this largely stems 
from a greater awareness in Indian thought to subtly approach complex issues which cannot be 
resolved by a single creed (Sutton, 2000, 8). In my view the character of Yudhiṣṭhira is also 
used to illustrate this reality, where seemingly irreconcilable natures are part of an individual 
character, for after a tumultuous history of rivalling thoughts with no central authority truth is 
seen as complex and subtle (Ibid). 
 Most dissonance within the didactus concerns various teachings on salvation (mokṣa). 
Although the didactus is densely populated with teachings on mokṣa, since it does not directly 
relate to our character study I will not focus much on these teachings. We can, however, find 
useful information in the value systems presented which facilitate an eventual salvific goal. 
There are two main value systems present in the world of the Mahābhārata and these are coined 
pravṛtti and nivṛtti. These main themes of epic thought are reflections on and continuations of 
the Vedic ritualism and Upaniṣadic asceticism from the Epic Age. In their most fundamental 
manifestations, pravṛtti and nivṛtti concern a strict social dharma with clear rules and purposes 
for individuals and groups and a rejection of such social significances where all forms of 
worldly action are condemned as materialistic, respectively. 
 Sutton clearly identifies these two strands and pins their fundamentally different 
characteristics in the following order (2000, 9-10). 
 
 pravṛtti  nivṛtti 
Social 
outlook: 
Beliefs and practices concerned 
with worldly existence, 
exemplified in Vedic ritualism. 
Suffering prevails in the material 
world, acting within it are 
materialistic and therefore barriers to 
absolute emancipation. 
Value 
system: 
Every individual has a role and 
purpose in the maintenance of this 
world (and the cosmos), 
exemplified in sva-dharma and 
caste hierarchy. 
Understand the spiritual identity of 
the self, distinct from the material 
forces that bind one. Cease 
acquisition of karma with absence of 
material action. 
Goal: Svarga-loka, joining one’s 
ancestors and becoming demigods. 
Salvation from this world and from 
material existence. 
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In his article on the semantics of the Sanskrit root √vṛt Bailey confirms how, in its use with a 
variety of prefixes, the frequency of pravṛtti and nivṛtti mentioned in the text stand out so much 
it becomes clear how significant these ideologies are in the text and are also used as devices in 
framing its contents (Bailey, 2016, 2). They are also used in close enough proximity to illustrate 
a fundamental difference between the two. In the narrative of the Mahābhārata discussions on 
destiny are multifarious and in how a specific character regards destiny one can associate either 
of these value systems to them. According to a nivṛtti perspective the control of destiny over 
human existence is so absolute that action in this world is considered to have no meaning. One 
cannot change the preordained outcome of events, which teaches one to be tolerant of one’s 
misfortunes (Sutton, 2000, 11). On the other hand, a pravṛtti outlook entails seeing the efficacy 
of actions producing desired results, therefore human endeavor is effective in shaping events, 
albeit still under a controlling force of destiny. However, destiny is not blind but shaped by an 
individual’s previous actions. A dichotomy between these doctrines is expressed as a tension 
which take place in the narrative as moral conflicts and dilemmas, often through debates (Ibid, 
8). In the narrative most conflicts occur around Yudhiṣṭhira, mainly because of his repeated 
insistence on universal ethics (based on nivṛtti values) above those of sva-dharma, which his 
family members urge him to uphold (Ibid, 318). Where exactly these instances play out in the 
narrative will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 The claim is often made that the Mahābhārata does not propagate either of these value 
systems of pravṛtti or nivṛtti as being superior to the other (Bailey, 2016, 2). Yet in an attempt 
to address and bridge both of these ideologies a third theme of epic thought is presented in the 
Mahābhārata, in arguably the most dramatic moment in the narrative5. Kṛṣṇa’s teachings in 
the Bhagavad Gītā, which are uttered to Arjuna moments before the battle of Kurukṣetra 
commences, addresses Arjuna’s, and in extension Yudhiṣṭhira’s, reluctance to fight. Kṛṣṇa 
propagates the philosophy of bhakti, which stresses detachment from the performance of one’s 
actions and their results. The merit of the Bhagavad Gītā lies in attempt to mediate between 
the two opposing referential frameworks of human aspiration (Malinar, 2007, 6). Bhakti does 
not deny or oppose either pravṛtti or nivṛtti systems but draws them both in and incorporates 
them into its own system, proving that a reconciliation of the two is possible (Sutton, 2000, 
14). 
                                                 
5 This position of the Bhagavad Gītā within a crucial moment during the narrative is for Malinar already a 
strong indication how the Bhagavad Gītā should not be attempted to understood outside its epic context, being 
intimately connected to the themes and issues of the epic narrative, but also that the Mahābhārata itself can be 
elucidated by the Bhagavad Gītā (2007, 2). 
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The Right Course of Action 
If we are to look at the teachings Kṛṣṇa preaches in the Bhagavad Gītā to address not only 
Arjuna’s reluctance but also Yudhiṣṭhira’s, whereas also serving as an ideology which 
synthesizes several divergent tendencies, it is useful to look at the particular philosophies which 
shape Yudhiṣṭhira’s rationale and how the teachings of the Gītā compare to these. In evaluating 
the dynamics of the philosophical schools of Sāṃkhya and Yoga compared to sva-dharma it 
will become clear how the Mahābhārata infers a preference for the doctrine of detached action6 
and bhakti expressed by Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad Gītā. 
 While scholars may disagree on which philosophical system is considered by the epic 
as having the most merit, there is some scholarly consensus that, of all philosophical doctrines 
and schools, Sāṃkhya and Yoga are the ones most often presented in the epic (Malinar, 2016, 
6). Especially the Sāṃkhya school seems to be the one most discussed by Sutton, who 
catalogued all the religious doctrines within the epic. Without delving too deep in this profound 
realm of philosophy, in its most fundamental form Sāṃkhya philosophy deals with an 
awareness of the separateness of puruṣa and prakrti. This basic dualism lies at the heart of this 
school of thought, and ignorance (avidya) keeps one from realizing this dualism. This has the 
following implications: 
 
That the self exists separate from the mind–body complex and the suffering associated 
with it, is the issue. This possibility of release here presupposes a dualism between the 
body and the self. The dualism between release and suffering and the dualism between 
the mind–body complex and the self are the main themes. Separation and difference are 
emphasized in the similes. The message is about non-attachment and the possibility of 
release from suffering. By not being attached to suffering, a person is released from 
suffering, just as a bird when a tree falls into the river unattached flies elsewhere 
(Jacobsen, 2007, 3). 
 
This very negative view of life is also portrayed in the narrative through countless instances 
where misery, decay, world age, disease and death disillusion both characters in the narrative 
as well as the audience. Hudson, for instance, claims that the entire Mahābhārata seems to 
drive home this point more than any other, that human existence is characterized by inevitable 
suffering. For her the Mahābhārata seems to muse on the notion whether or not dharma 
                                                 
6 Also referred to as niṣkāmakarma (Sutton, 2000, 67). 
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protects those who follow it (Hudson, 2013, 7). It does seem obvious that the epic stresses a 
nivṛtti outlook on the world. 
 However, in order to keep individuals from becoming passive ascetics, attempting to 
stop the acquisition of karma through the cessation of action and shying away from any 
responsibilities, the brahmins could not possibly solely propagate such views. As the severity 
of the motionless Jain ascetics in the previous chapter and Vyāsa’s admonishment of 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s consideration of the same as mentioned before in this chapter have illustrated 
mankind should not completely reject this world and their responsibilities in and to society. 
Sva-dharma entails a social view of religious life, where individuals have specific positions in 
the created order, a clearly defined relationship to all other beings (Sutton, 2000, 12). A 
preservation of this dharma results in both a functional society, with brahmins at the apex of 
the caste hierarchy, and the maintenance of the cosmic order. This, of course, stems from the 
idea of Vedic ritualism and the cosmic equilibrium. However, the view that humans must 
perform the right actions to get desirable outcomes for both this life and the afterlife was met 
with an increasing amount of skepticism for its materialism, not only in the Epic Age but also 
within the Mahābhārata itself. This philosophical outlook also trumped the ideal of attaining 
mokṣa, a goal that had already dethroned the primacy of svarga-loka. Whereas svarga-loka 
was seen as a temporary state after which the soul falls back to earth, mokṣa was considered an 
eternal state of liberation. Yudhiṣṭhira himself wonders who would want to go to svarga-loka 
if even the great gods and ṛṣis fall down (MBh: 12.9.34). 
 Here the philosophy in the Gītā attempted to reconcile the differences, all through the 
emphasis on one creator God, Kṛṣṇa. In eschatological thinking this philosophy had much in 
common with nivṛtti, it did have a negative outlook on the material world and salvation from 
it was obtained through restraint and a focus on Kṛṣṇa. However, it also accepted a pravṛtti 
perspective on the world by seeing it as God’s creation, and therefore it was concerned with 
the harmony of the universe where all beings were allotted with the right place and duty. These 
social duties had to be performed with an emphasis on detachment, never seeking personal gain 
through any action (Sutton, 2000, 65). The preservation of dharma, by each individual 
accepting and following his own dharma thus becomes a form of yoga, an act of devotion 
which pleases the deity (Ibid, 13). With the prominence of feelings of misery, loss and regret 
after winning the Kurukṣetra war the epic seems to drive home this doctrine of not being 
attached to the results. What Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna, that his misery is caused by his attachment to 
the fruits of his actions (Malinar, 2007, 228), applies to Yudhiṣṭhira just as much. Performing 
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one’s duties, albeit without anticipation for their rewards, thus ought to fulfill the needs of both 
pravṛtti and nivṛtti standpoints, and should therefore be conducive to attain salvation. 
 Yet, the different understandings of what following dharma actually entails from either 
a pravṛtti or nvrtti standpoint is what causes tensions not only in the didactic portion of the epic 
but in the narrative as well, and in almost all these tensions Yudhiṣṭhira stands at the center. 
Whereas following dharma from a pravṛtti perspective entails following one’s prescribed 
dharma in accordance with sva-dharma, which is determined by birth, caste, age and gender, 
a more nivṛtti understanding of following dharma has a more moral undertone, a code of ethics 
to be followed universally regardless of all the other criteria. Inspired by the philosophies of 
Buddhism and Jainism and other ascetic traditions, the qualities which pertain to this 
understanding of following dharma consist, among others, of piety, patience, forgiveness and 
selflessness as these facilitate a detachment from desire (Sutton, 2000, 111). It will become 
clear that Yudhiṣṭhira innately follows dharma in the nivṛtti understanding and embodies these 
very qualities, which causes the dharma-rāja to inadequately follow his duties as an actual king 
and ruler. 
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4. Yudhiṣṭhira’s Transforming Understanding of Dharma 
In the previous two chapters I have focused primarily on matters which belong solely to the 
sphere of religion or philosophical speculation. In showing how the intellectual developments 
during the Epic Age inspired the variety of didactic components in the Mahābhārata it seems 
that the next logical step is to locate these things within the character of Yudhiṣṭhira, and, more 
importantly, how this is realized. This is exactly what I plan to do, though this would fulfill 
only part of my initial aim. My aim was to indicate the intellectual history of Epic India not 
only in the didactic dimension of the Mahābhārata but in Yudhiṣṭhira as well, indicating a 
closer bond between the epic’s didactic and narrative aspects. Locating divergent ideologies in 
one character should therefore also lead to a consideration of purely narrative dynamics which 
are at play behind and around this phenomenon. The very focus on Yudhiṣṭhira, a literary 
character, by definition beckons a literary explanation in addition to the already sophisticated 
religious-philosophical dynamics at play around and within this character alone. As such, a 
question can be raised with regards to the interplay of didactic and narrative elements within 
the epic, and that question would be whether being well-versed in the religious and 
philosophical currents of ancient India and possessing a sound awareness of the various 
ideological tendencies of this time would greatly enrich the experience of the Mahābhārata 
narrative alone, realizing the full potential of the story as the authors intended it to be 
experienced, or whether even prior religious knowledge is essential in fully understanding the 
issues explored in the story. To counter this question is to state that the story can be understood 
completely on its own terms, without the copious didactic material or awareness of the 
intellectual history. 
 Yet, if the Mahābhārata is known as an epic filled with tensions and rivalries it should 
become clear that these very tensions in the narrative arise because of contradictory religious 
ideologies. Sutton notes very clearly how tensions arise in the narrative because of conflicting 
ideological notions on dharma, and how specifically Yudhiṣṭhira is at the center of these very 
tensions because his adherence to dharma conflicts with how dharma is understood by those 
around him, especially his family members (2000, 318). Sutton lists ten instances7 in the 
                                                 
7 These take place: 1) after the dice match when Bhīma desires revenge but Yudhiṣṭhira does not; 2) in the forest 
when both Bhīma and Draupadī urge Yudhiṣṭhira to stand up for himself but he sticks to his morality and 
tolerance over kṣatriya -dharma; 3) after Duryodhana and Karṇa are defeated by the gandharvas and Jayadratha 
by the Pāṇḍavas Bhīma wishes to take advantage of their vulnerability like a true kṣatriya, while Yudhiṣṭhira 
shows compassion and sets them free; 4) when Draupadī is harassed by Kīcaka and Yudhiṣṭhira urges tolerance 
of the situation, which both Draupadī and Bhīma disagree with; 5) in the Udyoga when Kṛṣṇa, Satyaki and other 
warriors are willing to wage war in revenge for the mistreatment of the Pāṇḍavas, Yudhiṣṭhira does not share in 
this feeling of revenge. Kṛṣṇa, is unable to convince him; 6) after the war when Yudhiṣṭhira laments over the 
25 
 
narrative in which this conflict of ideology takes place, in various shapes and guises. They all 
center on Yudhiṣṭhira’s pacifist and almost passive forms of restraint which are juxtaposed by 
his brothers who desire action and retribution. Though all of these instances deserve a close 
inspection, I would like to focus on two instances in the narrative which can be juxtaposed to 
see how Yudhiṣṭhira both exemplifies contradictory norms of dharma and also how these 
conflicts advance the main story. 
 
Dharma Before and After the War 
The two instances I will focus on are the events which take place 1) directly after the dice game, 
when the Pāṇḍavas go into exile, and 2) in the aftermath of the Kurukṣetra war, during the 
lamentations. These two instances are highly evocative both in their narrative merits and 
religious/philosophical speculation. It has been stated time and again, exemplified by 
Fitzgerald’s quote in the second chapter, how dharma lies at the center at these issues, and the 
foci I have chosen are by far the strongest examples of this. Both take place directly after a 
devastating confrontation between the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas wherein the subtlety of dharma 
is explored, almost even exploited to the fullest extent. During both the dice game and the battle 
of Kurukṣetra the conflicting notions of dharma are fought out and this gives way to adharma. 
Yet while the former indeed provides a turning point for the epic heroes, sending them off to 
exile during which they can plot their revenge, it pales in comparison to the devastating effects 
of the Kurukṣetra war. The battle, taking up at least five of the eighteen books (including the 
night massacre directly following the Kaurava’s defeat), is more than just a mere turning point 
of the narrative (Hegarty, 2012, 73). Its harrowing effects forever impact the characters and 
shake the very foundations of the world. It is this devastating difference between these two 
instances which make the events directly succeeding them interesting to focus on. 
 After these two events have played out, wherein dharma is nearly desecrated and leaves 
the epic heroes disoriented, a moment is taken to reflect on these events. Largely taking the 
form of debates in which not only the Pāṇḍava brothers and Draupadī partake but even sages 
and gurus sometimes give their two cents. But what makes these two foci stand out to warrant 
a juxtaposition are the different reactions Yudhiṣṭhira has to the events which just took place. 
                                                 
devastation of the war and refuses to accept the throne; 7) when Yudhiṣṭhira cannot accept the concept of 
dharma as taught by Bhīṣma; 8) after peace is restored and Yudhiṣṭhira can only think of forgiveness with 
regards to Dhṛtarāṣṭra whereas Bhīma thinks of him with disdain; 9) during the aśvamedha when Dharma comes 
as a mongoose and asserts that giving food to a beggar is a more significant act of dharma than the entire ritual 
itself, and 10) in the last moment s when Yudhiṣṭhira complains against the heavenly rewards bestowed to 
Duryodhana for his kṣatriya behaviour whereas he lacked any moral worth (Sutton, 2000, 318-319). 
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In these different reactions of the dharma king we not only find a transformation in the literary 
character but also a gateway into evaluating the merits of certain ideological outlooks. What 
also makes these instances so significant is how characters like Bhīma, Arjuna and Draupadī 
either commend or reprimand Yudhiṣṭhira’s views and behavior. Their quotes are key to 
understanding how the epic poets most likely regarded the merits of the ideologies exemplified 
by Yudhiṣṭhira. His views largely prioritize moral ethics, which exemplify virtues such as 
pacifism and tolerance, above sva-dharma, where an individual must act according to his 
prescribed duties (Sutton, 2000, 318) (Bowles, 2007, 144). In moments such as these the 
validity of Yudhiṣṭhira as a moral exemplar is questioned. 
 
“I Act Because I Must” 
I will not focus on the dynamics of dharma and the behavior of Yudhiṣṭhira during the dicing 
game itself, for this is focused on more in detail by other scholars8, I will focus only on the 
reflections on it in the third book, the Vana Parva. Here the Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī are exiled 
to live a life of austerity in the forest. It is an episode in which the epic heroes loathe their 
humiliation and turn to elder brother Yudhiṣṭhira with their feelings of retribution. Yet it is 
Draupadī’s initial pleas which ask the most profound questions, the ones the audience also 
wishes to be answered. She asks Yudhiṣṭhira what the point is of being good when it only 
brings grief, bringing up the classic problem of unmerited suffering: ‘why do bad things happen 
to good people?’(Das, 2009, 64). She states: 
 
Dharma is supposed to protect the good king, but I find that it doesn’t protect you. You 
have never strayed. You have always treated everyone alike. Even after winning all the 
earth, your head did not grow. After losing the crooked game of dice, you remained 
faithful to your word. 
(MBh: 3.31.3-79) 
 
This indubitably refers to Yudhiṣṭhira’s silence during Draupadī’s humiliation during the dice 
game. After Yudhiṣṭhira unsuccessfully waged his brothers and himself he was no more than a 
slave. Brockington notes how this fact of Yudhiṣṭhira having lost himself and therefore being 
a slave is often overlooked by scholars who question Yudhiṣṭhira’s lack of resolve and boldness 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Emily T. Hudson’s analysis in the second chapter, titled: Dharma and Rupture in the Game 
of Dice, of her book Disorienting Dharma: Ethics and the Aesthetics of Suffering in the Mahābhārata (2013). 
9 Transl. by van Buitenen, 1975. 
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during all the wrongdoings (2001, 255). Whereas this serves as a mechanism in the plot to keep 
the heroes from seeking justice immediately, taking away any power or agency from them, it 
also serves to illustrate Yudhiṣṭhira’s readiness to follow dharma. Him following the dharma 
of a slave, subject to Duryodhana, can be seen as the most extreme extent to which Yudhiṣṭhira 
will follow dharma as long as it prevents further tension or issues. When Draupadī questions 
why his anger is not set ablaze by the sight of the miserable state of his family members, and 
what the use is of following dharma so meticulously (3.18.17) if no one else does, Yudhiṣṭhira 
simply answers: 
 
I do not act for the sake of the fruits of dharma. I act because I must. Whether it bears 
fruits or not, buxom Draupadī, I do my duty like any householder… I obey dharma, 
full-hipped woman, not for its rewards… but by its nature my mind is beholden to 
Dharma. 
(MBh: 3.32.2-410) 
 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s sense of dharma here reflect on what has to be done, not specifically for a reward 
but as a standard of conduct. His almost Kantian outlook to uphold one’s duties for their own 
sake does not satisfy Draupadī (Das, 2009, 67). 
 Draupadī shares her dissatisfaction with and incomprehension of Yudhiṣṭhira’s moral 
outlook with Bhīma, who, characteristic of his famous kṣatriya-attitude, thirsts for vengeance 
(3.296.2–4). At moments such as these a contemporary reader, one with a penchant towards 
action and a dislike of asceticism or overt religiosity, would feel inclined to be more attracted 
to these characters, cheering at how they voice their dissatisfaction with Yudhiṣṭhira’s way of 
handling things. At moments such as these the literary and philology students wonder whether 
the epic poets consciously decided to portray the royal heir in such a negative light or whether  
the dharma-rāja possesses reasoning the audience11 ought to consider as wise beyond the 
capabilities of the likes of Bhīma and Draupadī. Brockington claims the latter is more accurate, 
stating that despite Bhīma and Draupadī seeming more attractive because of their comments, 
in essence they are little more than vividly-drawn stereotypes, (2001, 256). According to 
                                                 
10 Transl. by van Buitenen, 1975. 
11 One of Brockington’s most edifying insights is her awareness of there not being an audience but rather a 
multitude of audiences who heard the story of the MBh, and who all had different reactions to it (2001, 256). 
Also Reimann recognizes how in the cultural milieu of the poets of the MBh it was not unusual for a variety of 
audiences to either doubt or agree with Yudhiṣṭhira’s character. It is also worth noting how Jains and Buddhists 
had a completely different understanding of the MBh altogether (2011, 106-107). 
28 
 
Brockington, the audience is supposed to recognize in Bhīma not insightful comments on the 
nature of dharmic being, but rather the image of a ranting youngling, unable to understand 
dharma’s complexities. Brockington explains why: 
  
Bhīma was not created to think; thinking is Yudhiṣṭhira’s role. Bhīma’s is to exemplify 
might, endurance, unswerving loyalty and the instinctive no-nonsense impulses of the 
common man, to introduce human warmth and even a little gentle humour, but as a 
thinker, a younger brother fulfils the same role as a woman: to be automatically wrong. 
It is not a case of being portrayed actively as stupid, rather that he and his younger 
brothers are there to enable Yudhiṣṭhira to explain what is right (Ibid). 
 
I mention this quote because it illustrates why Yudhiṣṭhira should be seen as the center of 
attention, and while this insight is indeed accurate I do not fully agree with Brockington’s 
reasoning. The notion that Yudhiṣṭhira holds a higher ground on knowledge of dharma than 
his younger brothers and wife does prove true during this particular instance in the Vana Parva. 
However, over the course of the story Yudhiṣṭhira’s ability to explain what is right dwindles to 
a point where him being elder is no longer an indication of his expertise or authority. Goldman 
notes how “the investiture of the older or oldest brother with the authority of the father is a 
major feature of the Hindu family from the time of the Sanskrit epics down to the present” and 
that this is why the obedience the junior Pāṇḍavas have to Yudhiṣṭhira is upheld even when he 
leads them into disaster12 (1978, 328). This descent does not go unquestioned and this 
obedience is tested. And if Yudhiṣṭhira’s authority as an elder brother is tested, those close to 
him who question him become more than mere “vividly drawn stereotypes”. 
 
“Damn Warrior Behavior!” 
The other instance I wish to focus on can be easily juxtaposed with the previous focus to reveal 
the tremendous change the characters have undergone. The catalyst behind this drastic 
turnaround is of course the devastating war, where acts of adharma and unrelenting violence 
were necessary evils to keep the horrors from destabilizing even further13. As such, the dharma-
rāja  turned to an inconsolable state directly following the war. The lamentations of Yudhiṣṭhira 
                                                 
12 Goldman’s paper (1978) explored whether Indian  or Hindu narratives were familiar with Oedipal themes. His 
awareness of the elder brother having a similar authority as a father figure might also suggest a pseudo-Oedipal 
motif when Yudhiṣṭhira’s younger brothers question his behavior and decisions and claim to know better. 
13 Which is, ultimately, Kṛṣṇa’s, or actually Viṣṇu’s, reason behind his descent to the world of man: to uphold 
dharma (Sutton, 2000, 296). 
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are a far cry from his initial dutiful outlook we have seen, as he clings to a completely different 
understanding of dharma. Again a debate on dharma ensues between him and his family 
members, with this time the younger brothers and the wife holding an undoubtedly higher 
ground with their reasoning14. This debate also illustrates the conflict between pravṛtti and 
nivṛtti ideologies, with this instance having a way more decisive consideration of their merits. 
We also get a glimpse into what might be considered the epic poets’, and thus brahmanical, 
condemnation of the growing trend of asceticism. 
 Characteristic is Yudhiṣṭhira’s condemnation of kṣatriya-dharma, abhorring its violent 
and confronting nature while praising the virtues of equanimity, self-restraint, absence of 
enmity, non-violence and truthfulness (12.7.3-7). Whereas the war was won, Yudhiṣṭhira does 
not believe it was done for the right reasons or in the right way, but that the kingdom was won 
for selfish reasons, thereby renouncing his duty to rule. Disillusioned with the world, he states: 
 
Abandoning the way of life and the comforts of society, enduring tremendous ascetic 
observances, I shall live in the forest with the animals, eating only fruits and roots, 
pouring offerings onto the fire at the right times, bathing both times every day, wearing 
hides and rags, and piling my hair up on my head; and with my food intake limited I 
shall be lean. Enduring cold, wind, and heat, tolerating hunger, thirst, and fatigue, I shall 
dry my body up with the heat of the ascetic practices that are prescribed. [...] Living all 
alone, reflecting upon matters, living on ripe and unripe foods, satisfying the ancestors 
and the gods with offering of forest fire, water, and formulas from the Vedas, and thus 
observing the most fiercely intense set of norms in the rule books for forest life, I will 
await the dissolution of this body. 
(MBh: 12.9.4-615) 
 
Since kṣatriya-behavior brought about the war and thus the death of his relatives, Yudhiṣṭhira 
valorizes the behavior of ‘forest-dwellers’, mendicants who are above petty political squabbles 
(Bowles, 2007, 140). Here he directly opposes the notion of sva-dharma he seemed to follow 
without question earlier, being an unambiguous critique of brahmanic conceptions of dharmic 
order. His reasoning closely mirrors that of the Buddhists and Jains, claiming he will “be 
restricted to just the actions of blinking my eyes and so on, and I shall never be attached to any 
                                                 
14 This is might be the pseudo-Oedipal motif I mentioned earlier. 
15 Transl. by Fitzgerald, 2004. 
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of these” (12.9.2616). Practices such as these highlight those performed by the most austere 
ascetics, such as the motionless Jain monks mentioned in the second chapter. Whereas 
Yudhiṣṭhira always had a pacifist and non-confronting outlook, it should be noted that these 
lamentations are not merely his feelings of disillusionment after the war since he always 
possessed tendencies more akin to detached ascetics, as he is caught exclaiming he never 
wished to rule (13.76.15-1617). Yet when his family-members debate with Yudhiṣṭhira on what 
is the highest dharma since he seems to take an opposition considered even extreme for his 
standards18, it could be said that “the epic poets used every opportunity to broaden the terms of 
the debate. Such hyperbole, though quite probably founded in very real issues and debates, has 
its rhetorical function as well” (Bowles, 2007, 145). For the teachings within this didactic 
discourse to be considered valid, alternative voices are to be viewed as authoritative. 
 As such, when not just Bhiṣma, Vyāsa and Kṛṣṇa but also Arjuna, Bhīma, Nakula, 
Sahadeva and Draupadī collectively urge Yudhiṣṭhira not to forsake his kṣatriya and rāja-
dharma and not abandon social life lest the war would have been fought and won for nothing, 
we clearly see what understanding of dharma is being preached as superior. All these 
individuals proclaim the worldly dharma of a householder (gṛhastha) and a king to be the most 
beneficial for both the world and the afterlife, echoing the earliest dharmaśāstras (Ibid). With 
respect to the merits of ascetic life, Bhīma states: 
 
Renunciation should be made at a time of great distress, by one who is overcome by old 
age, or by one who has been cheated by his enemies”; so it is decreed. Thus those who 
are sophisticated do not recognize renunciation here, and those of subtle insight judge 
it to be a transgression of Law. How is it then that you have come to hold it as your 
ideal? That you have taken refuge in it? You ought to continue despising that; otherwise 
you are placing your trust in others. Your understanding of what the Vedas say is a 
falsehood that has the appearance of truth. It was initiated by unbelieving Naysayers 
who were impoverished because the Goddess Royal Splendor utterly abandoned them. 
                                                 
16 Transl. by Fitzgerald, 2004. 
17 “I don’t seek the pleasures of ruling, I don’t want to rule even for a second! On account of the law I consented 
to ruling, but there’s no law in it! Therefore I’ve had it with ruling! There’s no law in that! Given this, I’ll go 
alone to the forest with the intention of pursuing what’s right. There in the pure forests my rod laid down, my 
senses restrained, I will honour the law as a sage who eats roots and fruits” (MBh: 13.76.15-17, Bowles, 2007, 
149). 
18 Yudhiṣṭhira’s behaviour is directly polemicized along with the tendencies of ascetic forest dwellers, as they 
are seen as nāstikas, “nay-sayers”, which means atheist. While Yudhiṣṭhira is undoubtedly not an atheist, this 
admonishment is taken to the extreme to get the point across (Bowles, 2007, 145). 
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If one resorts to this baldness, this sham-Law, and supports only himself, it is possible 
for him to subsist, but not to live. 
(MBh: 12.10.17-2119) 
 
Not only do we witness here a clear condemnation of the ascetic way of life and similar 
ideological tendencies the brahmins had to deal with during the Epic Age, the fact that it is 
Bhīma, of all individuals, who proclaims such clear wisdom clearly illustrates how 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s expertise of and authority on dharma is not to go unquestioned. Bhīma, unlike 
Brockington’s insights, expresses more than a mere kṣatriya might with little intellectual 
potential. Whereas Yudhiṣṭhira was made to think and Bhīma to fight, the latter’s readiness to 
act is favored over the former’s overestimation of moral being. Even Arjuna admonishes 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s willingness to give up everything so impulsively, and makes him realize that 
even when seemingly doing nothing, one cannot live free from sin: 
 
Not even ascetics—those dummies who have taken to the forest, having removed anger 
and joy—can keep life going without killing. There are many living creatures in water, 
in earth, and in fruits, and no one does not kill them. What can one do but make life go? 
Some beings have such subtle forms that they are known only through inferences, and 
their bodies can be destroyed by merely batting the eyelashes. 
(MBh: 12.15.24-2620) 
 
Considering the didactic nature of this debate Arjuna’s argument should be seen as not just 
limited to Yudhiṣṭhira’s state in the narrative but as a polemic against the wider trend of world-
rejection which was gaining more appeal. It takes more to convince Yudhiṣṭhira, however, and 
it is not until Bhiṣma’s instructions in the thirteenth book that Yudhiṣṭhira begins to go back to 
the importance of sva-dharma and the importance of royal duties, having experienced enough 
to facilitate his transforming views on dharma. 
 It should be noted, however, that the points made by Bhīma, Arjuna, Draupadī and the 
like do indeed possess a polemic dimension with regard to the asceticism and other world-
rejecting tendencies, but they should not be mistaken as the final word and focus on sva-
dharma and world-affirming outlooks. The insights of nivṛtti schools of thought such as 
                                                 
19 Transl. by Fitzgerald, 2004. 
20 Transl. by Fitzgerald, 2004. 
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Sāṃkhya and Yoga are essential for the realization of the nature of the Self, and virtues 
surrounding detachment and equanimity are still recognized as beneficial in this pursuit. An 
issue arises when an extreme sense of world-weariness is seen as reason for renunciation, which 
is no more than a naïve attempt to dissuade from one’s prescribed duties. Society only functions 
when every individual holds up their respective dharma, not just anyone can so easily turn 
away from this. The entirety of the Mahābhārata’s didactic corpus does variably prize one 
lifestyle over the other, but in this particular instance the focus is clearly more on pravṛtti and 
sva-dharma as extreme world-rejection is seen as naïve and impossible. 
 
A Conclusion of Complexity 
This is the teaching Yudhiṣṭhira is meant to imbibe, being a kṣatriya and a royal heir he cannot 
possibly consider forsaking the duties that belong to these categories, yet the Mahābhārata is 
never willing to give such conclusions so easily. At every turn in the narrative, around all the 
tensions and within all the debates we are constantly reminded of the complexity of dharmic 
and moral being, and no easy explanation or resolution is given, only an awareness of 
complications. With regard to Yudhiṣṭhira, around whom all of this happens, the distinction 
between sva-dharma and morality are recognized and explored through his character. This 
happens both as a doctrinal issue and as a literary device to enhance the drama of the narrative 
(Sutton, 2000, 303). There are two principal types of dharma and the Mahābhārata shows an 
awareness of the tension between them: 1) sva-dharma – the specific duties incumbent on each 
individual in terms of social status, and 2) sādhāraṇa – a code of morality everyone is expected 
to adhere to (O’Flaherty, 1976, 94). The latter is in itself an already unfocused term influenced 
by many spiritual philosophies, yet we can deduce from its tension with sva-dharma that the 
epic poets imbibed Yudhiṣṭhira with certain qualities and values which we can attribute to 
sādhāraṇa. 
 If tensions arrive in the narrative because Yudhiṣṭhira prioritizes moral ethics above 
sva-dharma then his famous characteristic virtues of being gentle, patient and pious while also 
being devoid of violence can be understood as belonging to the sādhāraṇa designation. The 
Mahābhārata itself never really designates Yudhiṣṭhira’s morality as such, the nature of his 
very character suggests this moral side of his to be similar to sādhāraṇa’s conflict with sva-
dharma (Sutton, 2000, 305). However, if sādhāraṇa is described as “a code of morality 
everyone is expected to adhere to” then how can Yudhiṣṭhira’s virtues and qualities be 
portrayed as his tragic flaws? It seems more likely that his virtues are considered inappropriate 
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because they do not belong to his specific varṇa at all. The entire misunderstanding between 
Yudhiṣṭhira and his family members in book 12 (the Book of Peace) is on the proper 
understanding of dharma:  
 
Yudhiṣṭhira argues for the notion of a highest dharma in absolute terms; while the 
others insist that the only question relevant for Yudhiṣṭhira is what constitutes the 
highest dharma for kings, defending a more conservative brahmanic conception of 
dharma that privileges the householder (gṛhastha) above all others (Bowles, 2007, 
146). 
 
And it is because Yudhiṣṭhira muses on his notion of the “highest dharma” he is both treading 
on the intellectual jurisdiction of brahmins and at the same time claiming for the universal 
applicability of virtues such as ānṛśaṃsya (gentleness, absence of cruelty) and ahiṃsā 
(nonviolence) which characterize Jain and Buddhist monks. One is thus inclined to think that 
Yudhiṣṭhira belong to a list of characters – such as Bhīṣma, a celibate kṣatriya, Droņa, Kṛpa 
and Aśvatthāmā, warrior-brahmins - who threaten the maintenance of law (dharma) which 
drove Viṣṇu to appear on earth to maintain dharma (Sutton, 2000, 296). This irony of 
protecting dharma from even the dharma-rāja  furthers not only the idea that dharma in itself 
is recognized as having become a doctrinal issue but also the idea that Yudhiṣṭhira is a failed 
hero and moral exemplar who forces us to question the validity of the very concept. 
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5. Yudhiṣṭhira Juxtaposed and Contextualized 
I have taken a thorough look at the nature of Yudhiṣṭhira, his qualities, how he makes decisions 
based on those and how those decisions often result in unsatisfactory results for those 
immediately around him. I have focused a lot on how Yudhiṣṭhira received a lot of criticism 
because of this and this criticism can be extended beyond Yudhiṣṭhira to address the wider 
trend of world-rejection and we have come to question his dual brahmin-kṣatriya nature. Based 
on all this it can be easily surmised how the epic poets seem to portray his being and all the 
qualities relative to this as less than ideal when it comes to embodying an exemplar kṣatriya-
king. However, whereas we can safely surmise that the epic poets required us to regard 
Yudhiṣṭhira with certain reservations, he is also portrayed as a highly capable and incredibly 
wise individual, who also has the right makings of a king (2.30.2-521). A consideration of 
Yudhiṣṭhira as not at all embodying what is desired could not be further from the truth. And 
here we see how the Mahābhārata is unwilling to provide clear definitions or descriptions of 
ideals and truths. It has been stressed time and again that the Mahābhārata is not only rife with 
many philosophies which often contradict one another, but that it is aware of these conflicts 
and does not want to resolve any issue easily with formulaic dogmatic truths (Sutton, 2000, 7) 
(Hiltebeitel, 1980, 151) (Gitomer, 1992, 222) (Laine, 1991, 275). Yudhiṣṭhira can therefore 
never be explained away as a lacking kṣatriya monarch because of his brahmanic and ascetic 
values, as the latter characteristics are also portrayed as his unparalleled strengths. 
 Many passages are devoted to Yudhiṣṭhira’s qualities (3.180.21-3022) (5.147.32-3323) 
and how these are also essential for a just rule. However, this can be easily juxtaposed with his 
reluctance to rule and him failing the standards or values which are expected of a ruler 
(13.76.15-20). To make sense of this confusion and for it to become clear how exactly we are 
expected to look at Yudhiṣṭhira it is useful to assess him in relation to other major characters. 
Whereas it is very true that sometimes other individuals are presented as alternatives to 
consider fulfilling Yudhiṣṭhira’s responsibilities better, these are all meant to reflect back on 
                                                 
21 “…his adherence to the truth, and his subjugation of his foes, all the subjects were bent upon their own tasks; 
because of the correct collection of revenues and his law-abiding government, the monsoon rained abundantly 
and the countryside was fattened. All affairs prospered, especially cattle-tending, husbandry, and trade: all this 
was the doing of the king. Neither from robbers or cheaters, nor from the king’s favorite among themselves, did 
one hear a false word about the king” (2.30.2-5, transl. by van Buitenen, 1975). 
22 “While you lived by the Law, uprightly and truly,/You have won this world and the world beyond./At first 
you studied, obeying vow, (…)/You found no joy in the Law of the rustics … Nor abandoned the Law out of 
greed or Profit,/And thus by nature you are King Dharma”(3.180.21-30, Ibid). 
23 “He is true to his promises, never distracted,/Upright and prepared to obey his kin, Beloved of the subjects, 
kind to his friends, In control of his senses, support of the good./Forgiveness, forbearance, uprightness, 
control,/Avowedness to truth, great learning and zeal,/Compassion as well as authority -/ Yudhiṣṭhira has all the 
virtues of kings”(5.147.32-33, transl. by van Buitenen, 1978). 
35 
 
the very function of Yudhiṣṭhira within the plot. Such a juxtaposition thus shows more than 
just how other characters exemplify qualities that Yudhiṣṭhira lacks, it underscores his own 
qualities with a sense of superiority and this, in turn, warrants why we focus on only him at all. 
 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s Qualities and Shortcomings Next to His Brothers 
Those unconvinced of Yudhiṣṭhira’s capabilities as the dharma-rāja and a real king have 
indeed a lot of material to work with but the fact remains that the epic poets made him the royal 
heir. This simple and often unconsidered fact could be reason enough to not question his official 
right or even his worthiness of the throne. Yet one can consider how Karṇa is technically the 
elder Pāṇḍava, deprived of his right by fate. These dynamics are the reason behind the epic’s 
qualities of complicating matters to challenge the audience, which is also the reason behind its 
literary genius. Because of Karṇa’s fate we question whether we would have had a better 
contender for the throne if fate had been kinder. We know Karṇa exemplifies kṣatriya might 
and resolve, selflessness, generosity and possesses undying loyalty. Perhaps the tragedy of 
reality forces us to simply ‘make do’ with Yudhiṣṭhira and always wonder ‘what if’. However, 
next to this speculation lies the unambiguous fact that a basic importance is given to the 
Mahābhārata’s royal patriline altogether rather than individuals. The patrilineal unfolding 
begins with Gaṅgā’s intervention in the Pūru–Bhārata–Kuru lineage and is thus very much seen 
as following a divine plan (Hiltebeitel, 2011, 105). Add to this the overriding importance of 
the dynasty’s rulers and the belief that the king stands central in determining the nature of his 
world and its time (5.130.15-1724) and we have the basic reasons behind the importance of 
Yudhiṣṭhira alone (Thomas, 2007, 185). However, Yudhiṣṭhira is never depicted alone and the 
epic poets provide us enough material to compare Yudhiṣṭhira with the other Pāṇḍavas. 
 It is well known that each of the Pāṇḍava brothers are known for their respective 
qualities and traits taking on symbolic functions which complement one another, representing 
as a group an organic unity (Laine, 1991, 279). In the narrative situations take place – most of 
which happen in the Vana Parva (Book of the Forest) where the heroes undergo a “liminal” 
experience, stripped of all marks of differentiation and social status to experience egalitarian 
solidarity and universally applicable truths – where each character’s quality, and thus their 
wider symbolic value, is given an opportunity to shine (Falk, 1973, 2). In determining both the 
                                                 
24 “Have no doubt whether the time causes the king, or the king causes the time: it is the king who is the cause 
of the times” (MBh: 5.130.15-17, transl. by van Buitenen, 1978). 
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dynamics and usefulness of Yudhiṣṭhira’s qualities, his wisdom and restraint, we should look 
at whether these qualities are made to shine brightest.  
In comparing the prominence of Yudhiṣṭhira’s traits one will notice that his only direct 
“competitors” – for want of a better term since the brothers are all on the same side – are Arjuna 
and Bhīma (Nakula and Sahadeva, although incredibly talented and useful, are explored only 
little in comparison to their elder brothers, therefore I will not focus on them25). These three 
represent a power balance of symbolic functions such as power/energy/violence as opposed to 
restraint/wisdom. Laine even claims that this balance is mainly played out between the duo of 
Bhīma and Yudhiṣṭhira, whereas Arjuna “seems to be the focus for the most complete 
reflections on the hero as an individual possessing a complex variety of qualities” (1991, 280). 
This wider array of qualities, and thus greater symbolic value, would suggest we are to find in 
Arjuna perhaps a better candidate for the royal throne. This focus on Arjuna as the true epic 
“hero” might have a case. Allen, for instance, notes how, although Arjuna never becomes king, 
he symbolically often occupies that position (2007, 168). This he does representing his brothers 
collectively, which seem to echo Laine’s statement on Arjuna encompassing more than the 
symbolic power balance between Yudhiṣṭhira and Bhīma. Allan also notes that, “when Arjuna 
holds the spotlight, he does so by displaying kṣatriya prowess” (2007, 175). 
However, whereas Arjuna might indeed have qualities which span wider than those of 
Yudhiṣṭhira, the latter’s qualities reach further. Yudhiṣṭhira manages to save the day twice 
through his brahmanic wisdom and restraint. Where his brothers all receive boons which are 
all related to battle and warfare, Yudhiṣṭhira, in the story of Yama disguised as the crane, is the 
only one who receives favors related to waiting, disguise and restraint (3.29.23). The dharma 
he symbolizes is that of universal, saṃnyāsic virtues and the anti-structural values which 
characterizes liminality (Laine, 1991, 281). It is exactly through these qualities that Yudhiṣṭhira 
manages to save his brothers in this particular instance. When Yama asks him who the true 
brahmin is (3.177.14) Yudhiṣṭhira, although claiming that the virtues of truthfulness, patience 
and compassion are virtues of a true brahmin (3.177.16), he might as well be describing 
himself. Although he certainly does come across as some kind of “crypto-brahmin” because he 
embodies these saṃnyāsic values, during his exile his image as a renouncer is reinforced26. 
                                                 
25 The insights of Hiltebeitel also influenced me to not focus on them. Hiltebeitel noted how, during the time the 
Pāṇḍavas are supposed to live incognito, it is mainly Yudhiṣṭhira, Arjuna and Bhīma who take on disguises 
which seem to further the depth of their characters, unlike the twins (Hiltebeitel, 1980, 150). 
26 It should be noted how Yudhiṣṭhira, in describing brahmanic qualities, lists qualities which are part of nivṛtti 
and ascetic tendencies. This is because during the Epic Age, when brahmins were forced to respond to the 
growing asceticism, appropriated many ascetic tendencies themselves, leaving the other castes with more action 
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Using his wisdom he also saves Bhīma from a boa, and is capable of answering its questions. 
Allan agrees that in the third book the most salient brother is Yudhiṣṭhira (2007, 174). It seems 
only obvious that Yudhiṣṭhira, the one with brahmanic qualities and his ascetic outlook which 
caused him to claim that he was going to live as a simple monk in the wilderness, is in his best 
form in the “Book of the Forest”. One might even speculate that when Yudhiṣṭhira wept after 
the great battle at Kurukṣetra he was reminiscing his time in the forest. This would solidify his 
steadfastness behind this claim even more, rather than him just acting out and exaggerating 
because the war left him distraught. In either case, the epic poets did provide Yudhiṣṭhira with 
a big enough period to live the way that suited him most, expressing tolerance and 
understanding of the growing trend of asceticism and world-rejection, not to mention 
emphasizing its strengths. Therefore there was indeed place for such tendencies in a brahmin 
dominated society, as long as the society’s rules were upheld when back in it. 
 
The “Dark Contrast” 
One way we can determine which character lies at the narrative center is by looking at who 
directly opposes the villain, one who stands at the other end of the spectrum. Designating 
Duryodhana as the main villain is relatively easy since not many other characters appear to 
adequately fulfill this function. And if Duryodhana is put on one end of the spectrum, only 
Yudhiṣṭhira stands at the other. These characters are so antithetical that van Buitenen speaks 
of a “dark contrast” (1973, 15). This seems similar to Rāma and Rāvaṇa’s contrast in the 
Rāmāyaṇa. However, whereas this contrast functions on a literary level it is more than just a 
symbolic representation of “good” and “evil” as a plot device. The contrast between 
Yudhiṣṭhira and Duryodhana is more layered than this, thus the Mahābhārata presents a moral 
treatise in narrative form (Sutton, 2000, 305). 
 Since we have seen that despite Yudhiṣṭhira having some of the most salient aspects, 
he cannot be considered as flawless, considering how some of his qualities are also his 
vulnerability. Similarly, Duryodhana’s traits of egoism, jealousy, impatience and his violent 
nature are defining enough to antagonize him, yet they also prove as his strengths, illustrating 
what Yudhiṣṭhira lacks. One of the most basic differences that sets them apart, and something 
Yudhiṣṭhira perhaps should learn from, is how Duryodhana vies maliciously for the throne 
whereas Yudhiṣṭhira considers ruling a burden and is even depicted as having no qualms with 
                                                 
oriented duties. Yudhiṣṭhira, in listing these qualities as those belonging to a brahmin, thus feels more like a 
brahmin.  
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giving up his birthright. If Yudhiṣṭhira is admonished by Kuntī for showing signs of weakness, 
not obeying the essential law of a warrior, taking one’s stand at all costs, Duryodhana embodies 
very strengths Kuntī demands of her son unapologetically (Malinar, 2007, 39, 41). This 
illustrates, in Malinar’s words, the “skill of the epic poets” and in making both the Pāṇḍava 
and the Kaurava sides nuanced with their supporters of both war and peace, the Mahābhārata 
seems to question how to define the law of heroism: “what law must a warrior follow, on what 
authority, and how does the definition of kṣatriya-dharma affect the position of the king, who 
is supposed to protect and represent it?” (Ibid, 38). 
 Time and again throughout the epic we are reminded of the superiority of Yudhiṣṭhira’s 
character over that of Duryodhana. However, this is only based on moral and not ritual ethics 
(Sutton, 2000, 305). The depth of this contrast has a very didactic nature to it and we are 
confronted with two very different ideals. Yet it should not be mistaken how Duryodhana 
remains the most antagonistic character, which allows us to question whether the emphasis on 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s superiority over him can be seen as an indication of the importance of moral 
qualities over strict adherence to, or living in accordance with sva-dharma, or ‘ritual ethics’ 
according to Sutton. The tension between these two ideologies, which are an extension of the 
conflict between pravṛtti and nivṛtti, indicates how dharma has to almost equally valid aspects, 
and the tension between Yudhiṣṭhira and Duryodhana is thus very consistent with the teachings 
of the didactic portions of the epic (Ibid, 311). 
 Yet, while the didactic teachings resonate with the contrast between Yudhiṣṭhira and 
Duryodhana, the latter’s actual rivalry with the Pāṇḍavas are less played out in the narrative 
between himself and Yudhiṣṭhira over the throne but more between himself and Arjuna but 
primarily Bhīma over the more simple emotions of jealousy towards Arjuna’s prowess and 
hatred of Bhīma because he used to bully Duryodhana so much. These instances can be traced 
back to the brothers’ childhoods where Duryodhana expressed jealousy over Arjuna’s mastery 
of weapons (1.129.1). But what goes back even more and what probably runs deeper is 
Duryodhana’s hate and jealousy of Bhīma, which can be seen as the main cause of 
Duryodhana’s disdain of the Pāṇḍavas (Allen, 2007, 172). It is primarily Bhīma who is 
portrayed as uncompromisingly unforgiving to Duryodhana for Draupadī’s humiliation, which 
is portrayed as his chief sin. Yet, since the Pāṇḍavas themselves also commit a number of 
misdeeds, Duryodhana’s overarching sin, in the words of Gitomer, is thus seen as a more 
heinous wrong, opposition to Kṛṣṇa which theologically means being blind to Kṛṣṇa’s divinity 
(1992, 224). This fact has major didactic significance pertaining to the bhakti doctrine of the 
epic. Duryodhana’s blindness of Kṛṣṇa’s divinity could be seen as the ultimate sin to be avoided 
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by the righteous, and Duryodhana himself expresses his views on divinity as believing that the 
gods, by principle, cannot interfere in the matters of man, and that if they did they would be as 
weak as man (5.60.2-827). One particular instance that comes to mind where Kṛṣṇa’s divinity 
is blatantly overlooked by Duryodhana is during Kṛṣṇa’s first theophany in the Kaurava camp 
before the war takes place. This can be juxtaposed with the only other instance of Kṛṣṇa’s 
theophany, which happens in the Bhagavad Gītā to Arjuna, who is awestruck by the viśvarūpa 
form. This seems to directly contrast Duryodhana with Arjuna, and the latter’s acceptance 
results in the definitive doctrine of bhakti. 
 
Yudhiṣṭhira Addressed by Kṛṣṇa 
The Bhagavad Gītā not only serves as the center-point of bhakti theology but also as an all-
encompassing ideology which seeks to synthesize the pravṛtti and nivṛtti worldviews, thus 
holding quite an important place in the didactic portion of the Mahābhārata. An increasing 
amount of scholars see Kṛṣṇa’s teachings in the Bhagavad Gītā as integral to the Mahābhārata 
in both didactic and narrative terms, rather than seeing it as a later interpolation which does not 
directly relate to the contents of the Mahābhārata, with Malinar stating that our understanding 
of the Bhagavad Gītā will benefit our understanding of the Mahābhārata and that “it is 
intimately connected to the themes and issues of epic narrative and thus expresses an important 
dimension of its meaning” (2007, 2), with Sutton noting how the concerns of the Bhagavad 
Gītā are “difficult to understand without its being set in its epical context” (2000, 326). This 
dual awareness of both of these texts’ function in clarifying the other is driven home by the 
fact that the Bhagavad Gītā should ideally be studied as part of the narrative as context (van 
Buitenen, 1981, ix). Since I have already focused on the teachings of bhakti and niṣkāmakarma 
in the third chapter I will now briefly assess its relevance in the narrative pertaining to the 
individual characters involved. 
 Since the philosophical debate is between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, and Kṛṣṇa’s teachings are 
meant to instruct and convince Arjuna to fight, it has become an almost intuitive realization to 
view Arjuna as the Mahābhārata’s ultimate epic hero since he is so much emphasized on (Katz, 
1989). Arjuna’s well-known dilemma stems from his inability to reconcile kula-dharma and 
jāti-dharma with kṣatriya-dharma, envisioning that if he acts upon the latter he will not be able 
                                                 
27 “The Gods never act, like humans, out of love or greed, compassion or hatred, bull of the Bharatas. So if the 
Fire, the Wind, Dharma, Indra, and the Asvins were to act out of love, they would come to grief. Therefore you 
should not harbor such worries at all, Bharata, for Gods never concern themselves with other than divine affairs” 
(MBh: 5.60.5-7, transl. by van Buitenen, 1978). 
40 
 
to live with himself (Brodbeck, 2004, 83). He voices his reluctance to fight with notions of 
fear, injustice and even renunciation. This all seems incredibly reminiscent of the very 
dilemmas between the dharmas of kings, kṣatriyas, family and monks Yudhiṣṭhira struggled 
with throughout the story. In fact, when Kṛṣṇa admonishes Arjuna for his reluctance and tells 
him that “this cowardice unseemly to the noble” and urges him to “not act like a eunuch” and 
to rid himself of this “vulgar weakness” (24[2].2-4). These and many other chidings seem to 
speak more to the actions of Yudhiṣṭhira than Arjuna, since the latter had hitherto not appeared 
this reluctant. Even the concerns Arjuna raises and the ideas he sets forth to resolve them are a 
“contiguous part of the ethical debates that run throughout the Mahābhārata” (Sutton, 2000, 
326). This not only confirms the Bhagavad Gītā deeper connection with the rest of the 
Mahābhārata, it also suggests that the Bhagavad Gītā itself is more or less a response to the 
various tensions which surrounded Yudhiṣṭhira rather than Arjuna. Arjuna’s position in the 
Bhagavad Gītā thus “may be identified as being derived from the moral code of ethics 
repeatedly asserted by Yudhiṣṭhira throughout the epic” (Ibid). This brings Yudhiṣṭhira closer 
to the Bhagavad Gītā, almost seeing its teachings as being meant for him rather than Arjuna. 
 Yet, Kṛṣṇa’s teachings of detached action is not alien to Yudhiṣṭhira. In fact, we have 
witnessed how Yudhiṣṭhira claims he does not “act for the sake of the fruits of dharma” but 
that he acts because he must (3.32.2). This is exactly what Kṛṣṇa preaches in the Bhagavad 
Gītā, to follow one’s duty but not be attached to its fruits. The context of this quote of his did 
differ from his eventual attempt to distance himself from his duties, but it still shows how the 
dharma-rāja is well versed in all the dharmas, he just consciously prefers the universal moral 
aspects, which he holds on to until the very end. 
 
The Final Virtue 
In the Mahābhārata’s last moments, when the Pāṇḍavas renounce the world and ascend to 
heaven, Yudhiṣṭhira is put at the very center of attention and everything happens relative to 
him. This is the point where most likely a later author or authors tied up loose ends and instill 
a final, lasting impression. The Mahābhārata’s many natures and philosophies are indeed 
intended to reflect the tumultuous times of change from the Epic Age, there are also 
inconsistencies which are more likely products of all the gradual additions by authors and 
interpolators over time, rather than intentional contradictions (Smith, 2009, 101). These many 
changes were dealt with by later authors in different ways, and it is very likely that the closing 
section of the Mahābhārata was an ideal opportunity to reassert the righteous character of 
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Yudhiṣṭhira (Gonzales-Reimann, 2011, 102). Yudhiṣṭhira, as we have seen, has been 
throughout the epic portrayed as having blemishes, inability to prioritize between his duties, 
lacking not only kṣatriya but even basic manly resolve and a tendency to run away from his 
duties altogether. Next to all this even his most salient features do not seem to redeem him. To 
somewhat undo this and to reaffirm the efficacy and importance of moral ethics Yudhiṣṭhira is 
portrayed as being able to overcome these final trials. In both refusing to abandon the dog who 
followed him all the way up the mountain – who in reality is Dharma disguised – and refusing 
to leave his brothers and wife in hell to ascend to heaven alone serve as proof and final 
confirmation that he is a true follower of dharma. The point of this is for the audience to 
understand that, despite the blemishes he had throughout the story and in life, Yudhiṣṭhira 
ultimately is free from guilt (Ibid, 106).  
When climbing the mountain he is the only one without sin, unlike his brothers and 
wife, who all seemed to know better than Yudhiṣṭhira which dharma he ought to follow, as we 
have seen in the two instances focused on in chapter 4. Perhaps this inconsistency is further 
proof that the final section might be a later addition in an attempt to stress Yudhiṣṭhira as the 
defender of dharma. One would even surmise that the other Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī, who 
seemed to live according to sva-dharmic values and did not forsake their duties, would enjoy 
the proper eschatological reward and thus reach heaven without any obstacles. A case could be 
made that their suffering in hell was in essence an illusion to test Yudhiṣṭhira, and that they 
had already reached heaven. We cannot know this for sure since no stress is given to anyone 
other than Yudhiṣṭhira. Yet, regardless of these vagaries, it seems to be made abundantly clear 
that not only the experts in ritualism but also the moral person enjoys the delights of heaven 
after death (Sutton, 2000, 295). This is the final move of the brahmanical Mahābhārata, giving 
in to the universal moral ideals which threatened their existence, only to subsume it in their 
grander ideology in an attempt to encompass what became almost all of Indian thought. 
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6. Conclusion 
I have repeatedly stressed a number of points which were crucial to my argument of 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s role and importance to the Mahābhārata. These points were that 1) the didactic 
and narrative aspects of the Mahābhārata are not to be seen as distinct but part of a grander 
unity; 2) the didactic portion of the epic presents to us a number of philosophies, ideologies, 
morals, values and religious truths, and that these are prone to conflict with one another because 
they refer to different spiritual tendencies with different outlooks on the world; 3) if there are 
tensions between the different ideologies and philosophies in the didactic aspect that these 
tensions are represented in the narrative as moral dilemmas which the characters have to deal 
with; 4) the Mahābhārata is aware of its many contrasting philosophies and aims to bring them 
to the fore to instill an awareness of the contradictory views and the complexity of reality. A 
fifth point could be that, according to the likes of Sutton (2000), the Mahābhārata presents a 
variety of philosophies and displays an awareness of their incompatibilities for the reader, the 
diverse audience to make up its own mind by not providing a single, definitive creed to simply 
resolve any issue. If these points are taken as valid then the role and importance of Yudhiṣṭhira 
as being a locus of different philosophies and a conduit through which their merits are explored 
is an argument not hard to make or a conclusion not difficult to reach. Much insight can be 
gained from being aware of the historical context wherein the Mahābhārata took shape, as the 
didactic portions of the Mahābhārata become more understandable when keeping the 
developments of the Epic Age in mind. The narrative itself also seems to be elucidated by the 
religious didacticism and philosophical treatises, as we are able to pin characters from the 
narrative to these teachings. As such, the Mahābhārata can thus be viewed as an instrument of 
the brahmanic endeavor to reassert their relevance and that of their ideologies, although they 
compromised their earlier standards to fit the needs of the growing trend of world-weariness. 
 This conflict and eventual compromise between the old Vedic and the emerging ascetic 
orders lies at the center of the entire issue which is explored through Yudhiṣṭhira and which 
causes all the tensions and dilemmas in the epic. An age old – almost primordial – philosophical 
issue pertaining to mankind’s role and obligations towards the world, this issue inspired some 
of the most meaningful existential questions ever asked about mankind’s relationship with the 
world and divinity. Is the world, the creation of divinity, inherently a place we all ought to find 
our own worth and fulfill our duties for the betterment of a functional society and one’s own 
wellbeing? Or is the world, this material place, inherently evil and only a temporary abode as 
opposed to the eternity of divinity? Are we meant transcend the material realm, where we seek 
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entertainment and satisfaction for our senses, only to be lured deeper into this trap of egoism 
and self-interest, dissuading us from realizing our true Self and our true potential? Do our 
actions in this world have any worth and can we, through our actions, shape our own destiny 
and secure for ourselves a better life by living according to our ordained roles and their 
prescribed rules and duties? Or is action in this world meaningless, only furthering our 
entanglement in this cycle of karma and reincarnation? As we stay longer in this cycle, do we 
eventually forget ourselves or become less likely to realize our true self? If this is true, is it 
then not of utmost urgency to detach ourselves from all things which bind us to this realm, 
renounce our attachments and desires, calm our demanding senses to still our minds, only to 
meditate on the nature of Being or of divinity and escape the cycle? These incredibly 
contrasting ways of reasoning developed during the period in which the Mahābhārata was 
composed. Whereas before brahmanic dominance was equated with a stratified society based 
on ritualism and a duty-bound existence, the world-rejecting way of reasoning not only 
heralded the formation of new religious movements such as Buddhism and Jainism but also 
changed the Indian society and culture for good. 
 These incredibly contrasting views had significant repercussions for society. If a world-
affirming view on life was upheld and every individual lived according to his or her own duties 
then society would benefit from this. It is true that brahmins stood at the apex of the social 
hierarchy and that they undoubtedly benefited from everyone following the duties of one’s 
varṇa. Especially the ruling class had to accept how brahmanic wisdom served as guidance to 
the endeavor of ruling justly. Yet, whether or not brahmins reasserted their ideology for their 
own sake and wellbeing can never be fully attested, one can easily imagine the conundrum 
brahmins had to face. If an ever-increasing amount of people forsook their duties and society 
in general to live as ascetics and world-renouncers, and, to the worst extent, chose to inhabit 
the wilderness in an all-out rejection of the material world then society would suffer. In the 
worst case an individual as important as the king or any other ruler might act upon their 
inclination to abandon the royal responsibilities, and then there would be no functioning 
society. The world-rejecting tendency was a genuine exasperation with the growing 
complexities of social life and the unavoidable presence of suffering and death. However, in 
its worst forms it was a naïve belief that no action in this world matters and running away from 
one’s responsibilities could not adequately inspire to undertake a genuine philosophical and 
spiritual quest. Brahmins were quick enough to portray the most extreme ascetics, such as the 
motionless Jain monk, as individuals who acted out of ignorance of their own worth and 
potential, as we have seen in Arjuna’s quote in chapter 4. Such extreme cases of renunciation 
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were not to be condoned if it resulted in encouraging a universal applicability for living such a 
lifestyle. This way of life was not meant for just anyone. A life of renunciation was harsh and 
demanding, especially if the spiritual and philosophical capabilities the renouncer must possess 
are kept in mind. These capabilities all depended on qualities which only a few possessed, thus 
not just anyone could opt to live such a life. 
 However, as much as the brahmins wished to counter this growing world-rejection, they 
also realized how it was naïve to think that everyone could live according to their dharma. 
Dharma, as we have seen, was intended for so many different purposes by so many different 
traditions that dharma could not be simply followed as a standard without coming across a 
number of contradictions and grey-zones. The epic poets wanted to indicate how dharma was 
always believed to be just and right but because of its contested understanding different people 
can interpret it differently, giving rise to tensions, dilemmas and unclear ways to solve an issue. 
However, I would argue that the most important conflict of understanding of dharma with 
relation to Yudhiṣṭhira is understanding one’s dharma to be one’s nature. Whereas sva-dharma 
had prescribed duties for each varṇa, the belief was also that to be born within a varṇa is to 
innately possess a nature (dharma) which automatically coincides with the duties of your 
individual sva-dharma. To belief that every person was born with the innate qualities which 
helped them realize their place in society was also seen as naïve. Yudhiṣṭhira is the royal heir, 
being the eldest brother, and a kṣatriya. However, his very own nature (dharma) has much 
more brahmanic qualities – as we have seen in chapter 5 during the episode of Yudhiṣṭhira’s 
responses to Dharma in the forest – and evoke a natural born inclination towards asceticism 
and renunciation. He is the king, the last person to forsake his duties to follow his own 
inclination, the populace and the kingdom would otherwise be deprived from a just and capable 
ruler. Whereas his capability was indeed a bit contested, he did turn out a just and effective 
ruler. But he did so only by ignoring his preferred ideal of living a simpler life. The portrayal 
of Yudhiṣṭhira having a different dharma (nature) than his sva-dharma required him to have is 
a greater awareness of the fact that even the old, Vedic worldview of the brahmins was not 
ideal. The fact that it was the royal heir who ideally preferred a different life and never sought 
for the throne is only a greater illustration of the complexity of reality. 
 Neither the world-affirming pravṛtti or the world-rejecting nivṛtti ways of thinking were 
able to fully provide a realistic vision of the world. Both had their strengths and blemishes and 
it would depend per issue which worldview had more merits. In the Mahābhārata we are able 
to hear the voices from all the Pāṇḍavas during specific issues, as not everyone shares their 
support of Yudhiṣṭhira’s decisions and this only adds to the image of a composite hero, 
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representative of the many layered society. However, it is also indicated what happens when 
someone with a more nivṛtti perspective stands atop with a position to have the final word. 
Yudhiṣṭhira is not an effective ruler when he acts too much upon his preferred way of 
reasoning, which connotes tolerance and forgiveness. He is the last person to be able to afford 
a stance where he considers himself beyond worldly affairs, it is demanded he invests time and 
effort in them. He will have the opportunity to live according to his preferred lifestyle, but this 
can only be after a life in the world already lived. This Bhīma remarks as we have seen in 
chapter 4, and it indicates how there is no total condemnation of nivṛtti reasoning, not even for 
Yudhiṣṭhira. He can live as an ascetic, renounce the world and focus on meditation and still his 
senses, to be above worldly affairs, but only if the world itself has no longer need of him. 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s qualities have time and again proven to be helpful, saving the day more than 
once. He was not given his qualities if he was not to use them. And in the end, they are the 
reason behind his entrance into heaven. 
 Yudhistira’s sense of morality and his personal understanding of dharma, which is 
closer to nivṛtti values and has thus a more universally moral undertone as opposed to the 
prescribed dharmas according to sva-dharma, clearly make him the moral center of the story. 
But can he also be viewed as a moral exemplar? Does Yudhiṣṭhira provide a standard for others 
to aspire to? Does he even inspire others? This has become the most interesting question with 
regard to Yudhiṣṭhira’s role as a moral exemplar. The dharma-rāja does indeed uphold his 
moral beliefs to a fault, his surroundings and the situations he finds himself in all indicate how 
his understanding of morality is not always helpful. Yudhiṣṭhira’s decisions make us question 
how far one can come by living with his sense of morality. As such, Yudhiṣṭhira has become, 
other than a conduit through which the contrasting philosophies are explored, an instrument 
through which is reflected the entire idea of the concept of a moral exemplar and its validity. 
Are moral exemplars realistic about the world they inhabit? What does being a moral exemplar 
mean in a world where everyone has different understandings of it? Yudhiṣṭhira’s function as 
the moral and humane backbone of the Pāṇḍavas turns out to be the least effective and most 
dysfunctional of all the other qualities which belong to his brothers. But in the end, his depiction 
implies his lack of sin. What were his tragic flaws before become the qualities which grant him 
passage into heaven. And it is exactly this multi-layered characterization of Yudhiṣṭhira, this 
amalgamation of all the contradictory philosophies thrown into one, this most conflicting but 
by far the most realistic depiction of a flawed hero in an unforgiving world, which make him 
the most central and important character, and also the most difficult to understand. Bhīma, 
Arjuna and Draupadī are more popular and beloved because it is easy to appreciate their 
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qualities because they are clear, paragons of kṣatriya heroism and outspoken personalities in 
the face of adversity. But as a true reflection of reality and its contradictions, Yudhiṣṭhira will 
unfortunately not inspire similar cults or evoke notions of divinity. Yudhiṣṭhira himself is a 
thinker, who makes us think. 
 
Further Studies 
And yet, there is so much about Yudhiṣṭhira that remains unexplored or unexplained. In the 
beginning of the fourth chapter I mentioned how Sutton noted about ten instances in the 
narrative where a moral dilemma takes place because Yudhiṣṭhira prioritizes moral dharma 
over sva-dharma. In this thesis only two of those instances have been focused on, for further 
studies one can fully explore the other instances and the particular dynamics at play within 
them. Are they in any way similar to the ones I have focused on in terms of their ability to 
illustrate the larger issue of the tension in the world of religious and philosophical didacticism? 
Perhaps one can focus on all these issues and trace a gradual transformation of Yudhiṣṭhira’s 
understanding of dharma and what this connotes for the narrative by seeing this as part of this 
character development. All in all, we ought to see more of studies which focus on Yudhiṣṭhira 
alone, as there is so much to be learned from his statements concerning certain issues. This 
thesis could serve as an introductory orientation to both a focus on Yudhiṣṭhira, as this was not 
done extensively before, and him being a clear example of a character in the narrative who is 
connected to the didactic parts of the epic. Also, I have focused but little on the role of the 
Bhagavad Gītā in relation to all this. Another suggestion for further inquiry could be to trace 
Yudhiṣṭhira in exact passages of the Bhagavad Gītā, seeing where exactly Kṛṣṇa makes 
statements about those unwilling to perform their duty and how these statements seem to 
illustrate the behavior of Yudhiṣṭhira. A comparative study could also be done on Yudhiṣṭhira’s 
similarity with Arjuna as he is depicted in the Bhagavad Gītā, scared, distressed and reluctant. 
His concerns seem to directly echo those of Yudhiṣṭhira. 
 Beyond this particular focus on Yudhiṣṭhira lie other questions yet to be explored. If I 
insinuated Yudhiṣṭhira to be an indication of didacticism partaking in the narrative, then does 
that mean that the story of the Mahābhārata can only be understood with an overall awareness 
of the religious and philosophical discussions? How much of the story and the decisions of the 
characters can make sense to a general reader who is not schooled in the complexities of 
dharma and the contrast of the world affirming and world rejecting philosophies? Are these 
essential in understanding the story at all? This seems one of the drawbacks of inferring a closer 
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relation between the didactic and the narrative portions, but in all essence the most illuminating 
further study lies in the future of the general belief that the Mahābhārata does invoke a sense 
of unity and cohesiveness. In how many more ways can this be argued, proven or even 
disproven? All this is only testimony to the complexity and vastness of the Mahābhārata, its 
contents and dynamics which invite theologians, philologists and literary scholars to lay its 
secrets bare, for no one can ever claim to have fully understood the Mahābhārata. 
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